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CHAPTER 1
Introduction. Demography and Environment in the Previous Literature
1
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (IPCC, 2014) suggests that
human influence on the climate system is clear and growing, and the impacts are observed across
all continents and oceans. The report, in general, highlights that the more human activities
disrupt the climate, the greater the risks of severe and irreversible impacts for the ecosystems.
We have the opportunity to limit climate change and its risks, with several alternatives that
allow to support, at the same time, economic and human development. However, stabilizing
temperature increase at below 2 degrees relative to pre-industrial levels will require an urgent and
fundamental departure from “business as usual” scenarios which assume that future development
trends will follow those of the past and no changes in policies will take place. In such a context
we cannot ignore the fact that future population trends play a role.
This thesis analyses the relationship between population dynamics and the environment. In
particular, there are two reasons to be concerned with population when dealing with climate
change. On the one hand, population’s size is one of the main driver of emissions. On the
other hand, climate change might affect fertility and mortality rates, as heat waves and jumps
in temperature can modify the ability of people to procreate, may induce unexpected death
of infants at birth and can worsen the conditions of people already sick, especially among the
elderly. The first channel has been widely studied in the economic literature (Meadows et al.,
1972) but treating fertility as exogenous, while the second one is relatively new (Barreca et al.,
2015; Carleton and Hsiang, 2016). This thesis contributes to the existent literature developing
two models to reproduce long-term trends in the economy and climate, including endogenous
population dynamics. In the following Section 1.1 we briefly review the main issues arising
in the debate; Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 review the previous climate change literature and
endogenous fertility literature, respectively. Finally Section 1.4 resumes our contributions.
1.1 Population and Climate Change in the Current Debate
The underlying motivations of this work date back to 1972, when the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, the first Earth Summit, took place in Stockholm (UN, 1972). The
purpose of the conference was to identify a common outlook to inspire and guide people in
the preservation and enhancement of the human environment. Actions and proceedings of the
conference are collected in a Report and are synthesized in 26 Principles. Specifically, the 16th
Principle states:“Demographic policies which are without prejudice to basic human rights and
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which are deemed appropriate by Governments concerned should be applied in those regions where
the rate of population growth or excessive population concentrations are likely to have adverse
effects on the environment of the human environment and impede development”. Population
growth is recognized as one important driver affecting the preservation of the environment and
demographic policies are suggested as a mean to deal with it. In 1982 the Earth Summit was
held in Nairobi (Kenya). The Principles stated in Stockholm (1972) were reaffirmed and the
Conference commended the efforts of the Governments in adopting them. It recognized the need
of intensifying the efforts at the global, regional and national levels to protect the environment.
Ten years after, in 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
took place in Rio, with the goal of establishing an equitable global partnership through the
creation of new levels of cooperation among States. The outcome of the conference was a
Declaration made of 27 Principles which, some years later, in 1997, led (some of) the member
countries to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Among these Principles, the 8th one reiterates: “to
achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce
and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate
demographic policies” (UN, 1992).
Since Rio in 1992 onwards, the preservation of the environment and sustainable development
became increasingly relevant and turned to be the main goals of the next Earth Summits in 2002
in Johannesburg (South Africa) and in 2012 in Rio. The last United Nations Climate Change
Conference was held in Paris in 2015 and the Paris agreement was ratified by all countries after
one year. However, starting from the Earth Summit in Johannesburg (2002), population growth
and the discussion about demographic policies vanished from the policy debate, despite such
policies were a central theme in the previous meetings. Probably, experiences like the One-Child
policy in China made Governments afraid to propose interventions affecting personal choices of
people. In our view, demographic policies should still be part of the debate on climate change,
without forgetting that the freedom (not) to procreate is an inviolable right, so that population
policies should be carefully designed.
1.2 Population in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs)
Traditionally, climate policies are tested with simulation methods which reproduce long-term
trends. The type of models used in this stream of literature are called Integrated Assessment
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Models (IAMs). As the name itself suggests, these models integrate economic, policy, and
aspects of climate change. IAMs are used to produce different scenarios: starting from a baseline,
meaning that current policies as in 2018 are extended indefinitely, they calculate the impacts
of alternative assumptions on some key variables such as output, emissions and temperature
change. Then, several policies can be tested and costs and benefits of alternative strategies are
compared. Here below, we provide a short survey of the main (global) IAMs in the literature to
see whether and how population is considered.
We are not the first one modeling the relationship between economy, climate and demography.
IAMs, in general, reproduce long-term trends, including demographic trends too. The DE-
carbonisation Model with Endogenous Technologies for Emission Reductions (DEMETER-1)
by Gerlagh (2006) is a global level growth model with learning-by-doing for fossil fuels and
non-carbon energy. It analyses the possibility of de-carbonization through carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS). Population growth is considered as an exogenous driver and standard
population projections are reproduced. The Regional Model of Investments and Development
(REMIND) by Leimbach et al. (2010) is designed in a multi-regional structure. The version
called REMIND-G represents the whole world as the only region. The demographic component
reproduces an exogenous population law. So again, demography is part of the model but it plays
no role in terms of policy prescriptions. The most known IAM is the Dynamic Integrated model
of Climate and the Economy (DICE) by Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) which considers population
dynamics as exogenous and following a logistic type equations in which the growth of population
in the first period is given and then declines approaching a certain limit. Population dynamics
mimics the medium-variant scenario of the UN (2015). We will describe the DICE model with
more details in the second chapter of this thesis, as we extend this model in order to include
endogenous fertility choices.
Recently some IAMs model demography in a more sophisticated way. The ANEMI-21 by
Akhtar et al. (2013) is an Integrated System Dynamics Model for Analyzing Behavior of the
Social-Energy-Economic-Climatic-System also at global level. This model has a population
component based on WORLD3 2 population model. The population component of ANEMI-2
includes a four-level population model, meaning that population is divided into four age groups
(0 to 14 yr; 15 to 44yr; 45 to 64yr; and 65 to 65 plus). Fertility and mortality rates are modeled
1ANEMI is an ancient Greek term for the four winds, heralds of the four seasons; here ANEMI links physical
system such as the climate and hydrological- and carbon cycles with the socio-economic systems that change
them: the economy, land-use, population change, and water use and quality.
2the WORLD3 model is described in Meadows et al. (1972).
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too and feedback effects are taken into account in a continuous dynamic interactions among the
human population, climate and global resources. Though the ANEMI-2 population module is
quite detailed, the optimizing choice of agents with respect to fertility is not taken into account;
fertility and mortality rates are exogenously determined. The Integrated Model to Assess the
Global Environment (IMAGE) (Stehfest et al., 2014) is an ecological-environmental model that
simulates the environmental consequences of human activities worldwide. It represents interac-
tions between society, biosphere and climate system to assess sustainability issues such as climate
change, biodiversity and human well-being. The objective of the IMAGE model is to explore the
long-term dynamics and impacts of global changes that result from interacting socio-economic
and environmental factors. Regarding population, IMAGE assumes exogenous levels of total
population per region, household size and urbanization rate. Finally, in the climate Framework
for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) by Anthoff and Tol (2014), which is a
policy optimization model, scenarios of economic growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic
change through its impact on health: population decreases with climate-change related deaths,
such as cardiovascular associated with heat stress, malaria and others. Climate-induced mi-
gration between the regions of the world induces changes in population sizes. Immigrants are
assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host population. The
representation of the population module is quite detailed, but all demographic variables in the
model are directly or indirectly determined by exogenous scenarios.
Through years, researchers developed new scenarios integrating future changes in climate
and society. Recently, several papers (Kriegler et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2017; Riahivan et al.,
2017) describe a new set of projections simulating alternatives of societal development known as
the “shared socioeconomic pathways” (SSPs). 3 IAMs can take into account these SSPs in their
scenarios, in order to better understand which variables affect climate change the most. The
idea of SSPs is to agree on global pathways which describe the evolution of our society allowing
for a certain degree of uncertainty. Depending on how our society will evolve, the challenges
in terms of mitigation and adaptations would be higher or lower.4 The SSPs narratives collect
five qualitative descriptions of future changes in demographics, human development, economy
3The creation of SSPs derives from many meetings which result in guidelines to build these narratives. For
example the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (Carpenter et al., 2005) and the UNEP Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) scenarios UNEP (2002,
2007)
4The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) highlights two alternatives to
deal with climate change: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation comprises all human activities aimed at reducing
emissions to contain climate change. Adaptation, instead, refers to any transformation that takes place in natural
or human system in response to the (expected) impacts of climate change.
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and life style, policies and institutions, technology and environment and natural resources. In
particular, future demographic trends are derived from age, sex and education projections as
described in KC and Lutz (2017).
Figure 1.2.1: Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Source: O’Neill et al. (2017)
.
Figure 1.2.1 shows the main SSPs, which are five. Each of them corresponds to a certain
level of adaptation and mitigation, reported on the “x” and “y” axis. For example, SSP1
is depicted at the bottom left of Figure 1.2.1. In SSP 1, the combination of low population
growth due to education improvements, development of green technologies, a favorable outlook
for renewable energy, institutions that can facilitate international cooperation, and relatively
low energy demand, results in low challenges to mitigation. Moreover, the improvements in
human well-being, along with strong and flexible global, regional, and national institutions
imply low challenges to adaptation. On the other end, there is SSP3 in which high fertility
rates in developing countries, growing fossil fuel dependency along with difficulty in achieving
international cooperation and slow technological change imply high challenges to mitigation. The
limited progress on human development, slow income growth, and lack of effective institutions
implies high challenges to adaptation. For a complete description of each SSPs refer to O’Neill
et al. (2017).
As already said, researchers can use these SSPs narratives in their IAMs to reproduce the
current state of the world and to make projections. SSPs can be modified in order to take into
account other aspects of the society to better understand the drivers of challenges in mitigation
and adaptation.
The importance of demographic factors is highlighted in several works in this stream of lit-
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erature. Cuaresma (2013) uses population projections by age, sex and educational attainment
to obtain reliable gross domestic product projections which are fundamental in the quantitative
assessment of climate change effects. Cian et al. (2016) state that the influence of socio-economic
scenarios, including population scenarios, are fundamental to project the evolution of techno-
logical change. We are in particular interested in how these narratives reproduce population
dynamics: fertility rates, education choices and mortality rates are modeled exogenously, mean-
ing that they are not the result of an optimization process. Nevertheless, a policy on population
is not considered and, in such a context, uncertainty surrounding population can only be tested
just through the means of sensitivity analysis on key parameters.
We highlight that taking demographic patterns as given may drive to a large extent the results
of IAMs, potentially undermining the assessment of climate change costs. The existent IAMs
cannot address, at the moment, how a demographic policy would affect population dynamics -
and then climate change - when individuals take decisions following a maximization behavior
on how many kids to have or how much to invest in their education.
1.3 Endogenous Fertility Literature and Mortality
In this section we review the literature on endogenous fertility and we discuss about the morality-
temperature relationship. In order to model fertility and, then, educational choices, we refer to
the endogenous fertility growth literature. Since Becker’s seminal works (Beker, 1960), optimal
fertility decisions have been extensively analyzed in growth theory, but they have never been
included in the assessment of climate change using IAMa. Becker and Barro (1988) study
fertility choices in an intergenerational model in which altruistic parents derive utility from
their offspring and children utility. Moreover, children are themselves altruistic towards their
(future) children, which induces in parents a form of “dynastic utility”, as their “happiness”
depends also on grandchildren utility, and so on.
Latest works on this topics refer to the Unified Growth Theory (UGT) literature (Galor,
2005), where endogenous fertility is a crucial element to reproduce the demographic transition,
i.e. the demographic shift from high to low birth and death rates, which characterizes the
transition from stagnation to growth in the developing process (and is a condition for it). In
these kind of models, parents obtain satisfaction not only from having children, but also from
investing in their education. The investment in children’s education affect human capital growth
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which is recognized as a driver of economic growth also in climate change scenarios (Cuaresma,
2013). The choice between one additional child and the possibility to invest in his education
is modeled by the classic trade-off between quantity and quality of children, explained in the
seminal paper by Becker et al. (1973). This trade-off is a key element to account for the
joint demographic transition and economic take-off, through human capital accumulation, that
characterizes successful economies. Only recently this literature started including some concerns
about the environment, like pollution. Panayotou (2000) surveys the papers analyzing the
relationship between population and environment. Moreover, an even more recent work by (de la
Corix and Gosseries, 2012) analyses the effect of endogenous fertility on pollution. Compared
to our dynamic setting, these are theoretical growth models whose analysis concentrate in the
steady state. Though useful to gain some intuitions, our setting is more complex and complete
and give us the possibility to analyze with more details the linkages of interest.
An exhaustive discussion of population dynamics should consider also mortality trends.
Globally, life expectancy at birth is projected to rise from 71 years in 2010-2015 to 77 years
in 2045-2050; in Africa is expected to rise to 71 years in 2045-2050 UN (2017). Nevertheless,
there are some factors that may induce higher mortality rates. In particular, we are interested
in the effect of climate change on mortality, through temperature dynamics. There is a new
empirical literature studying the social and economic impacts of climate change (Carleton and
Hsiang, 2016; Hsiang et al., 2017) on gross domestic product and health. Some epidemiological
studies (Hajat et al., 2010; Medina-Ramon et al., 2006) find an ambiguous correlation between
deaths and increase in temperature. The nature of this relationship varies depending on the
geographical location and on the socio-economic status of population (Braga et al., 2002; Hajat
et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010). Huang et al. (2011) offer an extensive review about projecting
future heat-related mortality under climate-change scenarios. They find that, on the basis of
the climate-change scenario considered, it is possible to identify different patterns of mortality.
Though the link between temperature and mortality is still ambiguous, the scientific com-
munity agree on the fact that and an indiscriminate temperature increase could be harmful to
humans (IPCC, 2014).
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1.4 This Work
A green technological progress and a more sustainable production path are necessary conditions
to limit environmental damages. Nevertheless, demographic factors have an important role
in shaping the future environment. Nowadays, the world is split into two macro areas: on
the one hand, developed countries which face low fertility rates, aging population with high
levels of per-capita consumption and emissions; on the other hand, developing countries, which
show high fertility rates and lower per-capita emission compared to the industrialized areas
of the world. This poses the problem of how to design an efficient and fair global mitigation
policy. The problem is twofold: climate change has an impact on the whole population through
disasters such as droughts, sea-level rise, hurricanes; moreover global warming, resulting in
higher temperatures, worsens the living conditions of people, causing death in extreme cases.
On the other hand, a changing population level and growth affects environment too as a larger
population entails higher emission levels. A further step is considering whether climate change
strengthens the case for population policies. We investigate which type of demographic policy
could be suitable as a tool to reach win-win outcomes, meaning lower emissions levels, without
penalizing economic growth.
Few empirical works underline how demographic policies and climate change may be related:
increasing access to family planning and sexual and reproductive health and rights (education
and welfare), enlarge individual choices and opportunities. Moreover, this may help in achieving
sustainable development (UNFPA, 2012), may offset some impacts of climate change, i.e. food
security (Lutz, 2010) and it is a cost-effective way to mitigate human induced climate change
(PNAS, 2012). The inclusion of endogenous fertility adds completeness to the modeling effort,
as in reality people choose how many children to have. A recent contribution by Casey and
Galor (2016) shows that policies directed towards population may be beneficial for both the
economy, in terms of income gains, and the environment, in terms of lower emissions. Gerlagh
et al. (2017), instead, add population aging in an integrated assessment model of the economy
and climate change. They show that the optimal carbon price, i.e. carbon tax5, is upwardly
influenced by the population structure.
In the second chapter of this work, we include endogenous fertility. We model also the
temperature-mortality relationship assuming that, potentially, climate change will be detrimen-
5The carbon price is defined as “the additional decrease in GDP when decreasing emissions by an additional
unit of CO2” (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013).
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tal for health causing increases in mortality in future projections (IPCC, 2007; Carleton and
Hsiang, 2016). In the third chapter, we consider also education choices, modeling the quality-
quantity trade-off as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
In particular, the second chapter of this thesis extends the DICE model by Nordhaus and
Sztorc (2013) to include endogenous fertility and mortality induced by temperature increase.
Such a twofold nature of population growth might have important effect on quantifying the
social cost of carbon, i.e. the carbon tax. Since welfare is the discounted sum of the product
between per-capita utility and population size along with the fact that fertility affects utility
while mortality influences the size of population, accounting for endogenous demography gives
us the possibility to quantify their direct and indirect welfare effects. Moreover, we investigate
whether a demographic policy which imposes a cap on fertility is beneficial in terms of both
emissions and income gains. As expected, accounting for endogenous population increases the
estimates of the social costs of environmental policies (measured by the social cost of carbon), and
relying on demographic policy directed to stabilize fertility largely reduces the costs associated
with climate change (precisely by 16% by 2050). This clearly suggests that population change
does matter in the assessment of climate change and related policies, and that demographic
policy may be a valid tool to promote environmental sustainability.
In the third chapter, we build an integrated model of economy, climate and demography
by including endogenous fertility choice in an overlapping generations framework, modeling
also endogenous investment in education. We can capture the quality-quantity trade-off as
in de la Croix and Doepke (2003). This is an important difference compared to the second
chapter as we can clearly understand the mechanism that induces fertility to decrease. Our
model generates a population externality: each child contributes to the future level of emissions,
something that parents do not take into account when choosing how many children to have.
Policies affecting the level of investment in education of children are desirable in their own right,
but also accelerate fertility decline, which may have beneficial effects in the context of climate
change. So, instead of imposing a cap on fertility as in chapter 2, we design an education policy
aiming at lowering global fertility exploiting the quality-quantity trade-off. We show that the
resulting optimal population level is lower compared to the population resulting from a standard
climate policy. Population stabilizes around 10 billion of people by 2100 compared to 14 billion of
people without demographic intervention. This is an important result in terms of sustainability
and preservation of the environment. An optimal carbon price adjusted by optimal fertility
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level gives the possibility to contain the increase in temperature below 3 degrees with respect
to pre-industrial level by the end of this century. By using both policies, i.e.education and
demographic policy, at the same time it is possible to increase the quality of families, boosting
economic growth.
We think that demographic policies should be considered in the scientific debate and in future
climate agreements. In particular, policies addressing education can be extremely efficient and
should be a priority in the context of sustainable development (Lutz, 2014).
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CHAPTER 2
Population Growth and Climate Change: a Dynamic Integrated model of
Climate, Economy and Demography (DICED)1
1This Chapter is based on the paper “Population Growth and Climate Change: a Dynamic Integrated model
of Climate, Economy and Demography (DICED)” by Veronica Lupi (L.A.S.E.R. Doctoral School, Universities
of Milan, Pavia, Bergamo and Brescia) and Simone Marsiglio (University of Wollongong, School of Accounting,
Economics and Finance).
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Abstract
We analyze the mutual relation between population growth and climate change: on the one
hand, population is a driver of carbon emissions which is an important determinant of climate
change; on the other hand, climate change affects the mortality rate which determines the net
rate of population growth. Such population-climate feedback suggests that demographic policy
may be an alternative instrument to reduce the social costs associated with climate change.
We explore this possibility by introducing endogenous fertility choices and temperature-related
mortality in a global integrated assessment model of climate-economy, and we consider a pop-
ulation policy aimed at imposing a ceiling on population growth. We show that accounting
for endogenous population change substantially increases the social costs of environmental poli-
cies, but relying on demographic policy reduces such costs by 16% by 2050. This clearly shows
that population change does matter and demographic policy may be a valid tool to promote
sustainable development.
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2.1 Introduction
Since Malthus (1789) economists have extensively debated on the role of human population
dynamics in determining economic growth and environmental outcomes, but still nowadays
a clear understanding of their mutual relations has not arisen yet. Since population growth
determines the size of the labor force it may positively contribute to production, but since it
also gives rise to a dilution of resources in per-capita terms it may have negative consequences on
economic activities.2 For exactly the same reasons, through the interactions between economic
production and pollutant emissions, population growth may be harmful for the environment.3
Given the recent trends in population growth and the predictions about its evolution over the
next decades (UN, 2017), understanding the extent to which demographic changes may affect the
prospects for sustainable development is a current priority for both academics and policymakers.
This has been recognized since the first discussions on sustainable development, as emphasized in
the 1992 Rio Declaration: “to achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all
people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption
and promote appropriate demographic policies” (UN, 1992). However, despite the importance
of such an issue, very little has been done thus far in order to quantify the possible impact of
population change on sustainable development. This is the goal of our paper which, by focusing
on the mutual feedback between population growth and climate change, wishes to shed some
light on this delicate problem. In particular, focusing on climate change allows us to assess the
two-ways relation between economic activities and environment outcomes, explicitly accounting
for the role of population growth and eventual demographic policies.
Issues related to climate change are traditionally analyzed through integrated assessment
models (IAMs) which are computable general equilibrium models extended to account for a
climatic sector. In the simplest climatic framework, emissions generated by economic production
activities accumulate in the atmosphere affecting the temperature level, which in turn determines
the amount of output the economy is effectively able to produce. Several IAMs have been
developed and extended over the last decades (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013), but none of them
focuses the attention on population trends. In traditional IAMs population dynamics is taken
as exogenously given to eventually mimic the UN projections (UN, 2017), which predict that
human population growth will gradually decrease over time in order for the world population
2See Bloom et al. (2003) for a survey of the relationship between population and economic growth.
3See Panayotou (2000), for a survey of the relationship between population and environment.
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size to stabilize at a level of about 12 billions of people by the end of the century. This is based
on the assumption that also in developing countries a demographic transition will take place
generating a substantial reduction in fertility rates. However, nowadays in most developing
countries fertility rates are still much higher than in developed economies, and this fact along
with the wide uncertainty concerning future fertility patterns, represent serious challenges for
sustainability (UN, 2017; UNFPA, 2012). We do not wish to question UN population projections
but instead we wish to stress that taking demographic patterns as given in IAMs risks to drive to
a large extent their results, potentially undermining the entire assessment of the costs of climate
change and alternative policies. Our work wishes thus to make a first attempt in quantifying
the extent to which allowing for endogenous population change might matter in the analysis of
climate change.
We analyze the simplest IAM, the DICE-2016 by Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013), and allow
for population growth to interact non-trivially with both the economic and climatic sectors.
Specifically, population growth results to be the endogenous result of agents’ optimal decisions
regarding their fertility rates (i.e., how many children to have), which is determined by balancing
the utility gained from having children and the cost of raising children. Since Becker’s seminal
works (Becker, 1960; Becker and Barro, 1988), optimal fertility decisions have been analyzed
extensively in growth theory in a setting similar to ours (Palivos and Yip, 1993; Marsiglio,
2017) but to the best of our knowledge they have never been included in the assessment of
climate change. Moreover, in our framework population growth is endogenous also because the
mortality rate is positively affected by climate change: the temperature level determines health
conditions and thus contributes to reduce the pace of demographic changes. This is consistent
with several works suggesting that increases in the temperature level will be detrimental for
health causing increases in morbidity and mortality (IPCC, 2007; Huang et al., 2011); to the
best of our knowledge temperature-induced mortality has been only seldom included in the
analysis of climate change (Akhtar et al., 2013). Extending the analysis of climate change to
allow for such a twofold endogenous nature of population growth might have important effects
on quantifying the social cost of carbon and on exploring the role of demographic policy as an
alternative or complementary mitigation tool.
The social cost of carbon summarizes the cost of mitigation policies by measuring the welfare
effect of an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions in terms of consumption (Nordhaus, 2017).
Since welfare is the discounted sum of the product between per-capita utility and population
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size along with the fact that fertility affects utility while mortality affects the population size,
accounting for endogenous population changes allows us to quantify their additional direct and
indirect welfare effects. This is likely to have a large effect on the estimates of the social cost of
carbon, allowing for a better quantification of the costs of climate change and mitigation policies.
Mitigation policies explored thus far in IAMs include optimal emission abatement, imposing a
ceiling on temperature and other economic or environmental policies, while demographic policy
has never been specifically considered. However, since population policy can affect the fertility
rate and thus impact on the population size it is likely to have large (direct and indirect) welfare
effects, suggesting that it might be an important tool to reduce the social costs associated with
climate change (Marsiglio, 2017). Analyzing these delicate issues, which can play an important
role in effectively promoting sustainable development, is our main goal in this paper.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes some stylized facts about climate change
and population dynamics. Section 2.3 briefly presents our model which is basically a DICE model
extended to allow for endogenous population change. Agents by choosing their fertility rate along
with consumption and investment, which impact on the emissions and thus on temperature
which in turn affects mortality, determine the net growth rate of population. We also describe
our calibration strategy and the scenarios considered, which include also a demographic policy
aiming to impose a ceiling on demographic growth. Section 2.4 presents our simulation results
where we focus on the evolution of key economic, environmental and demographic variables,
including per-capita output, emissions, temperature, fertility and mortality rates. We show
how different policies affect such variables and in particular how population policy might be
an important mitigation policy since allowing for substantially reduce the social cost of carbon.
Section 2.5 shows through sensitivity analysis how our results are affected by uncertainty in
the value of some specific parameters. Section 2.6 presents concluding remarks and suggests
directions for future research. Appendix 2.A describes in full our model’s equations and the
parameter values employed in our analysis.
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2.2 Population Dynamics and Climate-Change Risk
This section reports some stylized facts about fertility patterns4, the consequences of the increase
in temperature in several countries and the effects of temperature-induced mortality on human
health.
Figures 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 show historical fertility and future projections based on the low,
high and medium variant scenarios by the United Nations (UN, 2017). All population projections
are constraint by the imperfect knowledge of current and future demographic settings and trends.
Although the demographic momentum inherent in population dynamics allow demographers to
produce projections with a comparatively high quality, it is impossible to be certain about future
demographic change. The medium variant is the most plausible scenario, while the low and the
high ones are the reasonable upper and lower bounds of realistic projections and indicate the
margin of uncertainty.
We consider fertility data for Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, North America and Ocea-
nia. Fertility is decreasing everywhere, in both developed and developing countries. Possibly, it
will stabilize by the end of the century. Notice that, though the pattern of fertility is similar,
i.e. positive but decreasing, the number of children per woman is different, depending on the
country considered. Given the high uncertainty of projections, the impact of fertility on total
population may vary significantly.
4Total fertility rate (TFR) compares figures for the average number of children that would be born per woman
if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and born children according to a given fertility rate at
each age. TFR is a more direct measure of the level of fertility than the crude birth rate, since it refers to births
per woman.
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Figure 2.2.1: Total Fertility Rate: Africa and Asia. Estimates and Projections. Source UN Population
Division Database
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Figure 2.2.2: Total Fertility Rate: Latin America and Europe. Estimates and Projections. Source UN
Population Division Database
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Figure 2.2.3: Total Fertility Rate: North America and Oceania. Estimates and Projections. Source UN
Population Division
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Several countries are already suffering due to climate change events, especially in Asia
and Africa. In Table 2.2.1 we report some data from the Climate Change Knowledge Por-
tal (CCKP).5 The CCKP is constantly updated: at the moment Bangladesh heads the list of
countries most at risk of flooding. Once every three to five years, up to two-thirds of Bangladesh
is inundated by floods. Moreover, cyclones, earthquakes and droughts devastate the country dur-
ing the year. With per capita GDP of about 1.220$, the economic losses in Bangladesh over
the past 40 years have been estimated around 12 billion, depressing GDP annually by 0.5 to
1 percent. Vietnam is threatened by rising sea levels: given its high exposure to floods and
storms, and the fact that two of its most important economic sectors- industry and agriculture
- are located in coastal lowlands and deltas, Vietnam has been listed by the World Bank as one
of the five countries that will be worst-affected by climate change. Overall, studies indicate that
climate change could reduce annual rice production by 2.7 to 9.1 million tons by 2050. Most of
Sudan, Africa’s largest country, is arid land or desert and most at risk of food deficits resulting
from the impact of climate change on agriculture. The Philippines, a middle-income country in
South east Asia, consisting of over 7, 000 islands, leads the list of nations most in danger of facing
frequent and intense storms. Finally, China is a country highly vulnerable to climate change,
in particular due to sea-level rise. In Table 2.2.1 we consider the five countries just mentioned
and other five that are already enduring the effects of climate change. We also show the cor-
responding fertility rate in 2010-2015, total population in 2015 and total population projection
in 2050. The last column shows the expected percentage change in total population between
2015-2050. The aim of this Table is to highlight that poor countries are the most hit by climate
change effects. Moreover, except from China, are the ones in which population is expected to
expand significantly in the next years. In this thesis population dynamics is considered a driver
of emissions and so of climate change. If this is the case, how many people there will be on the
planet becomes an important question in terms of sustainability.
5The Climate Change Knowledge Portal is updated by the World Bank to be a hub of information, data and
reports about climate change around the world
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Fertility Rate (2010-2015) Pop.2015, thousands Pop.2050, thousands %
Niger 7.63 19899 72238 263
Malawi 5.25 17215 43155 151
Afghanistan 5.13 32527 55955.35 72
Ethiopia 4.59 99391 188455 90
Sudan 4.46 12340 25855 110
Philippines 3.04 100699 148260 47
India 2.34 1311051 1705333 30
Bangladesh 2.23 160996 201953 25
Vietnam 1.96 93448 112783 21
China 1.59 1376049 1348056 -2
Table 2.2.1: Climate Change Risks: drought, flood, storm, coastal, agricultural. Fertility rates,
population (million) and population growth of some of the most vulnerable countries and regions of the world.
Source: World Bank, UN population division (medium variant).
Apart the importance of population dynamics in terms of climate change, emissions growth
is expected to persist driven by economic activities. Baseline scenarios, depending on the as-
sumptions, may result in global mean surface temperature increases between 3.7-4.8 degrees by
in 2100 (IPCC, 2014).
Figure 2.2.4 shows the average increase in temperature by country in the last 50 years. The
light-gray line represents the average temperature increase overall which is slightly less than 1.5
degrees.
Figure 2.2.4: World. Average Temperature Change in the Last 50 Years by Country. Source: Elaboration
of RIMFROS Data.
In Figure 2.2.5, instead, we report the average increase in temperature of the top 10 emitters
in the world. Notice that four out of ten (i.e. China, India, Brazil, Mexico) are defined as
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developing countries by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Figure 2.2.5: Top 10 Emitters. Average Temperature Change in the Last 50 Years. Source: Elaboration
of RIMFROST Data.
Another relevant dimension of climate change is its possible impact on human health. Cli-
mate change currently contributes to the global burden of disease and premature deaths (IPCC,
2007). Human beings are exposed to climate change through changing weather patterns. i.e.
more intense and frequent extreme events, and indirectly through changes in water, air, food
quality and quantity, ecosystems, agriculture and economy. These effects are projected to pro-
gressively increase in all countries and regions. Temperature changes could aggravate some
diseases with obvious consequences on human health. In Figure 2.2.6 the arrows give the direc-
tion and the magnitude of climate change influence on some selected diseases.
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Figure 2.2.6: Direction and magnitude of change of selected health impacts of climate change.
Source: IPCC, 2007
This broad picture wants to suggests that economy, climate and demography are linked to
each other. Though our climate-economy model is global and can’t reproduce in detail all the
facts exposed in this section, it considers endogenous fertility choices and temperature-mortality
relationship.
2.3 The Model
We extend the simplest integrated assessment model in order to account for the mutual links
between population growth and climate change. Specifically, we focus on the Dynamic Integrated
Climate-Economy (DICE) model in its 2016 revised version (Nordhaus, 2017), and we introduce
endogenous population change to allow for population growth to be the result of optimal planning
decisions and to both affect and depend upon climate change. In all integrated assessment
models population growth is assumed to be exogenous and generally to gradually decrease over
time in order to allow human population to stabilize to some exogenous level in the long run.
This is a strong simplification of reality where population growth is determined by individuals’
fertility decisions, and as such it may respond to economic incentives. Therefore, relaxing such
an assumption of an exogenously growing population allows us to consider demographic policies
as an additional tool to reduce the costs associated with climate change.
In the standard DICE model, the exogenous evolution of human population, Nt is described
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by a logistic-type equation as follows:
Nt+1 = Nt(1 + gt) (2.3.1)
where its growth rate gt exogenously decreases at a constant rate δN as follows:
gt =
g(t−1)
1 + δN
(2.3.2)
Such a completely exogenous demographic characterization is the simplest way to allow human
population to approach a limit of 11.5 billion people in 2100, as hypothesized by the projections
developed by the UN, in the medium variant scenario (UN, 2017). However, this can be ac-
counted for also without imposing any specific constraint to the evolution of human population.
Indeed, in our approach we allow human population to be optimally determined and to converge
to this exact level in 2100. In our setting, the growth rate of human population is endogenously
determined as follows: gt = nt − d(Tt), where nt is the optimal fertility rate and d(Tt) is the
mortality rate which depends on climate change and in particular on the temperature level, Tt.
Therefore, population dynamics is given by:
Nt+1 = Nt[1 + nt − d(Tt)] (2.3.3)
The fertility rate is endogenously determined and we assume that it affects the instantaneous
utility function (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2005; Palivos and Yip, 1993), which is specified as
follows:
u(ct, nt) =
(ctn
κ
t )
1−ζ − 1
1− ζ , (2.3.4)
where ct =
Ct
Nt
is per-capita consumption, ζ the marginal elasticity of consumption and κ ∈ (0, 1)
the relative weight of fertility in the utility function. The traditional setting in integrated
assessment models is that κ = 0, precluding any role for fertility decisions. Introducing fertility
in the utility function introduces also an additional control in the social planner’s maximization
problem, which therefore allows us to understand how population dynamics may be affected by
specific policies. Similarly to Voorhees et al. (2011), we model mortality as follows:
d(Tt) = d1exp
d2Tt (2.3.5)
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where d1 and d2 are exogenous scale parameters. The equation above aims to capture in the
simplest possible way the relationship between temperature and mortality, which thus far has
never been considered in integrated assessment models, except for Akhtar et al. (2013). Several
papers document the existence of a positive association between temperature and health con-
ditions, suggesting how increases in frequency and intensity of heat waves may be detrimental
for health, affecting thus mortality (IPCC, 2007). Accounting for such effects of climate change
on mortality might help us to quantify more precisely the size of the potential costs induced by
climate change.
The introduction of fertility decisions in our setting implies that income can also be used
to raise children. Therefore, the closed economy’s resources constraint is given by the following
expression:
Yt = Ct + It +Rt, (2.3.6)
suggesting that aggregate output, Yt, can be devoted to either consumption Ct, investment, It,
or child-rearing activities, Rt. As in Barro and Sala–i–Martin (2005), we assume that the cost
of raising children is linear in capital as follows:
Rt = hntKt, (2.3.7)
where h is a scale parameter and Kt is the aggregate capital stock. The above formulation
entails a trade-off between income per capita at disposal and quantity of children, since raising
children subtracts resources to capital investment. In order to look at this, note that with some
straightforward algebra the economy’s resource constraint in per-capita terms can be expressed
as follows:
kt+1 =
yt + (1− δK)kt − hntkt − ct
1 + nt − dt , (2.3.8)
where lower-case letters denote per-capita variables. Specifically yt is output per capita, kt
capital per capita, ct is consumption per capita and δK denotes the depreciation rate of capital.
From equation (2.3.8), it is clear that an increase in the fertility rate negatively affects the future
per-capita level of capital by reducing the resources left for investment and by increasing capital
dilution; this tends to let income decrease at a lower rate and therefore consumption too in the
following period, affecting thus future fertility decisions. This stresses the existence of a clear
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trade-off between per consumption and quantity of children
Fertility decisions, by determining the population size and therefore the labor force, play
a crucial role in driving climate change. Indeed, since labor is an input in the production
function, by affecting output fertility decisions determine the level of pollutant emissions which
is an important driver of climate change. Specifically, the net (of abatement and damage)
production is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function as follows:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t , (2.3.9)
where Yt is aggregate output, Kt is aggregate capital, Nt is total population, 0 < α < 1 is the
capital share of income and At the exogenously growing level of technology determining total
factors productivity. Industrial emissions, which is an important component of total emissions
which in the end determine climate change, are proportional to output; therefore, a larger
population size by increasing emissions leads to faster variations in the temperature level, which
in turn negatively affects population growth through mortality. Because of such a two-ways
relation between population growth and climate, demographic policies aiming to modify agents’
individual decisions regarding how many children to have can play an important role in reducing
climate change.
Apart from the above mentioned peculiarities of our setting, all other elements of the DICE
model are entirely preserved. The complete specification of the economic and climatic sectors is
reported in appendix 2.A. Therefore, our framework consists of a standard DICE model extended
to allow for population dynamics to be affected by agents’ optimizing decisions twofold: (i)
agents directly determine the fertility rate which determines one component of the net rate of
population growth, and (ii) agents indirectly (via their consumption and investment decisions)
affect the evolution of temperature which by impacting on the mortality rate determines another
component of the net rate of population growth. Understanding how these channels work and
how specific policies might affect them and in turn contribute to reduce the social costs of climate
change is our main concern. As usual in integrated assessment models, we quantify the cost of
climate change with the social cost of carbon, which measures the economic cost caused by an
additional unit of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere. This provides us with a rough estimate in
dollar values of the social cost of emissions. Specifically, we wish to understand the extent to
which endogenous population change matters in quantifying such a cost and what role specific
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demographic policies can play in order to effectively reduce it.
2.3.1 Calibration and Scenarios
In order to be able to derive some meaningful comparison, we mainly rely on the same set
of parameters and the same scenarios employed in the standard DICE model. Regarding the
parameters, we only need to calibrate those related to the demographic peculiarities of our
setting, that is κ, d1, d2, and h. We set the relative weight of fertility in the utility function, κ,
according to Growiec (2006), Boikos et al. (2013) and Marsiglio (2014). We choose the cost of
raising children, h according to Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2005) and the mortality parameters,
d1 and d2, are instead calibrated to represent the world mortality rate due to climate change
(Voorhees et al., 2011). The value of these parameters are therefore the following: κ = 0.8,
d1 = 0.007, d2 = 0.002 and h = 1.3. All other parameters are exactly the same as in the
standard DICE model and are listed in Table 2.A in appendix 2.A. For what concerns the
scenarios, we rely on the three basic DICE scenarios plus an additional one to account for
demographic policy. Following DICE, we analyze a baseline scenario, an optimal scenario and a
temperature scenario; following the rationale behind this latter scenario we propose a population
stabilization policy scenario. Each of these scenarios is briefly described below.
(a) Baseline: the business as usual scenario (BAU) assumes no changes in the climate policy
with respect to the 2015 levels. This means that current policies are extended indefinitely.
(b) Optimal: the optimal scenario optimally determines climate policy by determining which
share of emissions to abate in order to maximize social welfare, accounting for the impacts
of climate change on output and therefore consumption. This scenario assumes the most
efficient climate-change policies; in this context, efficiency involves a balancing of the
present value of the costs of abatement and the present value of the benefits of reduced
climate damages. Although unrealistic, this scenario provides an efficiency benchmark
against which other policies can be measured.
(c) Temperature: this scenario imposes a constraint on the global temperature level, requiring
temperature not to exceed 2 degree with respect to the average temperature in the pre-
industrial era. This scenario is consistent with the recent Paris agreement in December
2015, in which governments of several countries have agreed on the long-term goal of
keeping the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees. In order for this goal to be
effectively achieved, the cooperation of all major emitters around the world (i.e. USA and
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China) and the involvement of the developing countries is a necessary condition. Several
researchers are skeptics about the effective ability to achieve such a goal, and as Nordhaus
(2017) highlights, it will be almost impossible to achieve the target even if drastic climatic
policies are introduced since today. This scenario allows us to quantify the efforts and the
costs needed to effectively reach such a goal.
(d) Demography: this scenario imposes a limit on the level of human population, required not
to exceed 9 billions of people by the end of the century. This scenario is consistent with the
low variant of the UN population projections, but differently from other IAMs we do not
assume that such a demographic stabilization will occur automatically but might need to
be implemented with specific policies. Since climate-agreements are signed on voluntary
basis and countries have common but differentiated responsibilities depending on their
socio-economic conditions, the effective success of such agreements is highly uncertain.
We thus believe that relying on the de-carbonization of the production plans and on
climate policies alone might not be enough and thus we explore how alternative policies,
in the form of demographic policies, might contribute to decrease emissions and to combat
climate change.
The results of our scenario analysis are presented in the next section. We focus on some key
variables, and in particular on per-capita GDP net of climate costs, per-capita consumption,
industrial emissions, temperature level, atmospheric CO2 concentrations, emission control rate,
fertility and mortality.
2.4 Results
Our model starts from 2015 and each period lasts five years. Table 2.4.1 presents the results
of our scenario analysis until 2050 in the standard DICE and in our endogenous-population-
extended DICE models, respectively. As a matter of simplicity in what follows we shall refer to
our extended model as the “DICED” (“Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy-Demography”)
model. From a quick comparison of the two models it is straightforward to note that DICED and
DICE have the same initial level of income and consumption per capita, of industrial emissions
and temperature. Starting from 2020 projections change: this is the result of endogenizing
population in DICED. The level of fertility determines population differently from DICE, though
in the long-run total population converges to the same level. This strongly affects the medium
33
and long run outcomes: by 2050 in the baseline scenario the DICED model predicts lower
industrial emissions (−23%), lower net output (−11.5%) and consumption per-capita (−14.1%)
and lower atmospheric concentration level (−4.2 percentage) compared to the baseline of the
DICE. Similar conclusions extend also to the optimal and the temperature scenarios. In order
to understand to what extent demographic policies might be effective in combating climate
change, we now compare the Demography scenario with the other scenarios implemented in
DICED. We can note that the demographic policy guarantees higher per-capita output (+4.4%)
and consumption (+5%) by 2050. As far as industrial emissions are concerned, the temperature
scenario is the most effective scenario, in which industrial emissions are predicted to reach
zero in 2050; this highlights a complete shift of our economy from fossil fuel-based production to
renewable. Nowadays this option still seems quite unrealistic. The differences of the demography
scenario from the optimal one are small; this suggests that a demographic policy may help
in mitigating climate change and, at the same time, increase the living standards of people.
Regarding temperature, we can note that in the demography scenario the temperature level
increases by 2 degree by the mid century.
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Figure 2.4.1: Simulation’s Results: Net Ouput Per capita amd Industrial Emissions
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Figure 2.4.2: Simulation’s Results: Emission Control Rate and Temperature
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Figure 2.4.4: Simulation’s Results: Fertility and Mortality.
39
The evolution of our key variables is presented in Figures 2.4.1- 2.4.4. The black curve
represents the baseline scenario, the dashed black curve the optimal scenario, the gray curve the
temperature scenario and the dashed-gray curve the demography scenario. The demographic
policy guarantees the highest net income per-capita during the entire planning horizon; since
fertility is lowest in such a scenario, the dilution effect is lowest allowing aggregate output to be
split between fewer people. The most effective policy in abating emissions is the temperature
one; the demographic policy performs quite well and it is close to the optimal case, though
emissions are slightly higher. The rationale behind this result can be understood by focusing
on the evolution of the emission control rate. In the case of the temperature scenario the
emission control rate reaches 100%, meaning full abatement by 2050. The optimal scenario
determining the most efficient climate policy, predicts an increasing emission control rate without
ever achieving full abatement. Since in the demography scenario, the planner has another
instrument at his disposal to decrease emissions (i.e., limiting fertility), a lower level of the
emission control rate can be used. This is still effective, compared to the BAU scenario and
has the advantage to guarantee higher level of income per-capita with respect to the optimal
scenario. Temperature is a key variable: imposing a limit on population growth prevents us
to reach a temperature above 3.5 degree Celsius by the end of the century. The evolution of
the fertility rate is quite the same both in the optimal and the temperature scenarios, while
it gets substantially smaller in the demographic scenario. The mortality rate is lowest in the
temperature scenario, but still substantially smaller than in the BAU also in the other two
scenarios. Overall, we can conclude that the demographic policy is an effective tool, as it is
close to the optimal policy but guarantees higher standards of living. Nevertheless, this is
still not enough to keep the temperature well below 3 degree Celsius increase with respect to
pre-industrial levels.
Finally, Table 2.4.2 presents the social cost of carbon (SCC) computed from the DICE and
our DICED model. We can note that in the baseline version of DICE the SCC in 2015 is about
31.2$/tCO2, while in DICED it is substantially higher and precisely equal to 39$/t. Similar
qualitative differences apply also in other scenarios: in the optimal scenario the SCC is 30.7$/t
in DICE and 37.9$/t in DICED while in the temperature scenario it is 155$/t in DICE and
204$/t in DICED. It is interesting to note the effects of demographic policy which helps to
substantially reduce (by around 15$/t with respect to the baseline) the social cost of carbon.
Indeed, in the case of demographic policy the SCC is 32.6$/t. This suggests that demographic
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policies can be an effective means to combat climate change at lower social costs.
Variable Scenario 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050
SCC, DICE Baseline 31.2 37.3 44.0 51.6 90.5
(USD dollars) Optimal 30.7 36.7 43.5 51.2 91.0
Temperature 155.4 194.2 241.5 298.8 658.4
SCC, DICED Baseline 39.0 42.5 48.1 55.3 96.9
(USD dollars) Optimal 37.9 41.3 46.8 54.0 95.3
Temperature 204.3 228.1 267.5 320.1 693.7
Demography 32.6 36.3 41.3 47.3 80.2
Table 2.4.2: Social cost of carbon in the DICE and DICED models.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In the following section we analyze the extent to which uncertainty about some parameter
impacts the main results, summarized by emissions and the social cost of carbon (SCC). Emission
is the variable connecting economy, environment and demography. The social cost of carbon,
instead, is the main outcome of IAMs. Specifically, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the
weight of fertility with respect to consumption, κ, and on the rearing cost of children, h. We
decrease (increase) these parameters by 5%, separately. Overall, our sensitivity analysis suggests
that our main results are not significantly affected by perturbations in some parameters.
Table 2.5.1 shows the results of varying κ on emissions and on the social cost of carbon
(SCC). The variation is expressed in percentage terms with respect to the baseline values. A
decrease in κ leads to a decrease in emissions through time and to a lower SCC, compared to
the baseline case. Note that the quantitative effects of an increase or decrease in the parameter
are identical, and particularly small. An increase in κ leads exactly to the opposite effect. Table
2.5.2 is related to the effects on emissions and on the SCC of changing κ. A lower value of
h leads an increase in emissions and a subsequent increase in the SCC. Exactly the opposite
occurs when h increases. Also in this case the quantitative effects of an increase or decrease in
the parameter are identical, and particularly small.
Parameter Variable 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050
κ ’low’ Emissions 0 -0.052 -0.059 -0.039 0.13
SCC -0.4 -0.53 -0.6 -0.61 -0.63
κ ’high’ Emissions 0 0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.012
SCC 0.046 0.057 0.062 0.064 0.065
Table 2.5.1: Effects of changes in κ.
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Parameter Variable 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050
h ’low’ Emissions 0 0.34 0.49 0.55 0.57
SCC 0.05 0.48 0.65 0.71 0.68
h ’high’ Emissions 0 -0.34 -0.48 -0.54 -0.56
SCC -0.05 -0.48 -0.64 -0.70 -0.67
Table 2.5.2: Effects of changes in h.
2.6 Conclusions
Population growth and climate change are mutually related: on the one hand, by determining
the size of the labor force, the population growth determines the output and therefore the level
of emissions, which in turn contribute to climate change; on the other hand, climate change
affects health conditions through the mortality rate, which in turn determines the population
growth rate. Despite the existence of such important channels, no IAM has thus far analyzed
the extent to which population change matters in quantifying the costs associated with climate
change.
In order to do so, we extend the simplest IAM (i.e., the DICE) in order to allow for en-
dogenous population change where agents optimally determine their fertility rates. This adds
reality to our model and allows us also to analyze the role that demographic policy may play
in mitigating climate change. Specifically, we consider a demographic policy aiming to impose
a ceiling to the population growth rate in order ensure that by the end of the century the pop-
ulation size will achieve a level consistent with what predicted by the low variant of the UN
population projections. We show that: (i) accounting for endogenous population substantially
increases the estimates of the social costs of environmental policies (measured by the social cost
of carbon), and (ii) relying on demographic policy reduces the costs associated with climate
change (precisely by 16% by 2050). This clearly suggests that population change does matter
in the assessment of climate change and related policies, and that demographic policy may be a
valid tool to promote sustainable development.
Given the complexity of this topic, we have tried to present our arguments in the simplest
possible framework. This however has precluded us to take into account other relevant issues, in-
cluding a more detailed demographic setting, like an overlapping generations one, the assessment
of regional costs and the analysis of migration.
Indeed, in a regional setting it might be possible to identify the winners and losers from
climate change and how different policies might be used to ensure a certain degree of equity
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across regions; it might also be possible to account for regional migration, which is another
essential determinant of demographic growth. Extending the analysis along these directions is
on top of our future research agenda.
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Appendix
2.A The Equations of the DICED Model
The social planner maximizes social welfare, W , which is the product between per-capita utility
and population size, Nt, discounted by the rate of time preference, ρ:
max
ct,nt
W =
T∑
u(ct, nt)Nt(1 + ρ)
−t (2.A.1)
In equation (2.A.1) per-capita utility depends on per-capita consumption ct and fertility nt and
it is specified as follows:
u(ct, nt) =
c1−ζt n
κ(1−ζ)
t − 1
1− ζ (2.A.2)
where ζ is the marginal elasticity of consumption and κ the relative weight of fertility with respect
to consumption. Per-capita consumption is the ratio between the aggregate consumption, Ct
and the population size, Nt:
ct =
Ct
Nt
. (2.A.3)
Population, Nt, and labor perfectly coincide since there is no unemployment. Demographic
dynamics is therefore captured by the following equation:
Nt = Nt−1[1 + nt − d(Tt)] (2.A.4)
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where the growth rate of population, gNt = nt−d(Tt), is given by the difference between fertility
and mortality, d(Tt). Mortality depends on the temperature level as follows:
d(Tt) = d1e
d2Tt , (2.A.5)
where d1 and d2 are scale parameters.
The output net of damages and abatement is denoted with Qt and is equal to:
Qt =
[1− Λt]Yt
1 + Ωt
, (2.A.6)
where Ωt represents the damage function linking the effects of climate change on the production
process, Λt is the abatement cost and Yt is gross output. Gross output is produced according
to a constant returns to scale capital Cobb-Douglas production function combining capital, Kt
and labor, Nt as follows:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (2.A.7)
where At denotes the total factor productivity, which grows at an exogenous rate g
A
t as follows:
At = At−1(1 + gAt ) (2.A.8)
where δA determines the decline in the growth rate of the total factor productivity:
gAt =
gAt−1
(1 + δA)
(2.A.9)
The economy is closed and its resource constraint is given by:
Yt = Ct + It +Rt, (2.A.10)
where It is investment and Rt child-rearing activity. Child-rearing activities are proportional to
the stock capital Kt as follows:
Rt = hntKt, (2.A.11)
where h is a scale parameter. The law of motion of capital depends on investment and capital
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depreciation as follows:
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + It (2.A.12)
where δK is the constant depreciation rate.
Total emissions, Et are given by the sum of land-use ELUt and industrial EIt emissions as
follows:
Et = EIt + ELUt (2.A.13)
where land-use emissions are exogenous and modelled as:
ELUt = ELUt−1(1− δL). (2.A.14)
where δL is the constant declining rate of land use emissions.
Industrial emissions EIt, instead, are a by-product of gross production and determined as
follows:
EIt = σt(1− µt)Yt (2.A.15)
where µt is the optimal emission-control rate and σt is the exogenous level of carbon intensity
which evolves as:
σt = σt−1egσt (2.A.16)
where gσt is the growth rate of σt which reads as:
gσt = gσt−1(1 + δσ) (2.A.17)
where δσ is the exogenous rate of energy efficiency.
Equations (2.A.18) - (2.A.20) reflect the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere, MATt,
upper atmosphere, MUPt, and lower oceans, MLOt:
MATt = Et + φ11MATt−1 − φ12MATt−1 + φ21MUPt−1 (2.A.18)
MUPt = φ22MUPt−1 + φ12MATt−1 + φ32MLOt−1 (2.A.19)
MLOt = φ33MLOt−1 + φ23MUPt−1 (2.A.20)
where φij is the transfer rate from reservoir i to reservoir j.
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Accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere leads to global warming, through changes in
radiative forcing. Specifically, the increase in radiative forcing, Ft, since 1900 in watts per square
meter (W/m2) is given by:
Ft = η
{
log2
[
MATt
MATPIt
]}
+Ot (2.A.21)
where Ot is the forcing of other GHGs (CFCs, CH4, N2O,...) and MAT
PI
t is the pre-industrial
level of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (equal to 596.4 GtC, about 280 parts per million).
Changes in radiative forcing are linked to temperature, Tt, as follows:
Tt = Tt−1 + c1Ft − λTt−1 − c2(Tt−1 − TLOt−1) (2.A.22)
TLOt = TLOt−1 + c3(Tt−1 − TLOt−1) (2.A.23)
TLOt is the increase of temperature in the deep oceans, λ is a feedback parameter, σi are transfer
coefficients reflecting the rates of flow and the thermal capacities of different sinks.
The relationship between global-temperature increase and income loss is described by the
following damage function, Ωt:
Ωt = ψ1TAT
ψ2
t AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (2.A.24)
where TATt is the increase of temperature in the atmosphere.
Finally, the cost of emissions abatement, Λt, in terms of income loss is given by:
Λt = (1µ
2
t )K
α
t N
1−α
t (2.A.25)
The DICE model calculates the social cost of carbon which represents the economic cost
caused by an additional unit of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere. The cost is the monetized
damage on the discounted intergenerational utility of consumption. The SCC is a signal, a mea-
sure in dollars that estimates the (social) cost of emissions (see Tol, 2011 for a literature review
on the SCC). Mathematically, the SCC is the shadow price of carbon emissions along a reference
path of output or emissions. Following Nordhaus (2017) we take a discrete approximation to
compute the SCC:
SCCt = −dW/dE
dW/dC
(2.A.26)
where the numerator is the marginal impact of emissions at time t on welfare, while the de-
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nominator is the marginal welfare value of a unit of aggregate consumption in period t. The
ratio calculates the economic impact of a unit of emissions in terms of t-period consumption as
a numeraire.
The complete list of parameters and their specific values used in the simulations is reported
in Table 2.A.
Parameter Value Definition
h 1.35 Cost of children
κ 0.8 Preference for children
d1 0.007 Mortality coefficient
d2 0.002 Mortality exponent
ζ 1.45 Elasticity of consumption
ρ 0.015 initial rate of social time pref(year)
α 0.300 Capital elasticity in production function
δK 0.100 Depreciation rate on capital per year
δA 0.005 Rate of technology per year
δL 0.115 Decline rate of land emissions (per period)
δσ -0.001 Rate of energy efficiency
φ11 0.810712 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ12 0.189288 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ21 0.097213 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ22 0.852787 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ23 0.05 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ32 0.003119 Carbon cycle transition matrix
φ33 0.996881 Carbon cycle transition matrix
η 3.6813 Forcings of equilibrium CO2 doubling (Wm-2)
λ 1.18 Feedback parameter
c1 0.1005 Climate-equation coefficient for upper level
c2 0.088 Transfer coeffic upper to lower stratum
c3 0.025 Transfer coeffic for lower level
ψ1 0.0028388 Damage quadratic term
ψ2 2.00 Damage exponent
1 0.074 Abatement quadratic term
2 2.00 Abatement exponent
Table 2.A.1: Complete list of parameters and their values.
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CHAPTER 3
Endogenous Fertility and Climate Change Policies1
1This chapter is based on the paper “Endogenous Fertility and Climate Change Policies” by Veronica Lupi
(L.A.S.E.R. Doctoral School, Universities of Milan, Pavia, Bergamo and Brescia). I am grateful to professor Reyer
Gerlagh (CentER, Tilburg School of Economics and Management) for his valuable suggestions and supervision.
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Abstract
We investigate the role of endogenous fertility in an overlapping generation model with climate
change. We adopt a standard quality-quantity trade off framework, with endogenous investment
in children’s education. We explicitly model the channels between fertility choices and emissions.
Beyond the global negative externality generated by climate change, our model produces a second
externality, i.e. a population externality, which has to be corrected for. We compare the effects
of a standard climate policy and of a mixed climate-population policy on emissions, demography
and economy.
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3.1 Introduction
After the Paris conference on climate (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the
first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. Governments all over the globe agreed on
integrating climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning. Neverthe-
less, planetary warming continued in 2016, setting a new record of about 1.1 degree above the
preindustrial period, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Statement
on the State of the Global Climate in 2016 (WMO, 2017). The debate among researchers and
policymakers is focused on studying efficient mechanisms to reduce emissions as the transition
from a fossil fuels production to one based on renewables is extremely expensive. Several signals
induce to think that it might be fundamental to focus on the interplay between environmental
issues and population dynamics Despite a declining fertility, global population is still growing
at about 80 million per year (RoyalSociety, 2012). An uncontrolled population growth increases
the level of emissions, worsening climate change consequences. In fact, fertility choices impose
external costs to society as a whole. Parents may not be fully informed or may not have access
to means for controlling births. The adoption of demographic policies can therefore be justified
on economic grounds.
Population control is a controversial topic. Philosophers and economists have been asking
themselves if the idea of an “optimal population” could be justified in ethic terms. People’s
freedom (not) to procreate is an inviolable right. Our idea of population policies is related to
programs promoting women’s social status, health and education. There is evidence that such
interventions can lead parents to freely choose lower fertility (Abel et al., 2016). History has
shown that population growth can slow down without coercion.
We investigate the role of endogenous fertility in an overlapping generation model with cli-
mate change. We follow the literature on quality-quantity trade off framework, with endogenous
investment in children’s education. We explicitly model the channels between fertility choices
and emissions. Beyond the global negative externality generated by climate change, our model
produces a second externality, i.e. a population externality, which has to be corrected for. We
compare the effects of a standard climate policy and of a mixed climate-population policy on
emissions, demography and economy. Population policies such as investments in education of
children, particularly on girls’ education, are not only desirable in their own right, but also
accelerate fertility decline, which may have significant benefits in the context of climate change.
53
O’Neill et al. (2001) state that slower population growth in developing countries will not only
tend to reduce emissions but is also likely to increase the ability of societies to adapt to the
impacts of climate change.
Models of endogenous fertility and education are based on the idea that parents derive
satisfaction from having children and in supporting their course of studies. As education is
expensive, however, parents face a trade-off between the number of children to generate and
the amount of education to provide them with. A trade-off emerges between quantity and
quality of children. Since the seminal contribution by Becker et al. (1973), several papers
have addressed fertility decisions and analyzed the so called quality-quantity trade-off. The
relationship between fertility, human capital and economic growth has been subsequently studied
by Becker et al. (1990) and Galor (2005), among others. Recently de la Croix and Doepke (2003)
developed a new theoretical link between inequality and growth in a model with interdependent
fertility and education decisions. Poor parents decide to have many children and invest little
in their education. They show that an increase in inequality lowers average education and,
therefore, income growth and find that this fertility differential effect accounts for most of the
empirical relationship between inequality and growth. Only a handful of papers have studied
environmental externalities associated with fertility decisions. When a public good externality
(climate change) is present in a model with endogenous fertility choice, Harford (1998) shows
that two instruments are needed for Pareto efficiency: a pigouvian tax on pollution and a tax
per child. When choosing the number of their offspring, parents do not take into account
the environmental damage to which their children will contribute in the future. Endogenous
fertility choice thus creates an externality which is called population externality. Based on this
theoretical contribution, Bohn and Stuart (2015) quantitatively assess the size of this population
externality with a view to the associated policy prescriptions. In their exercise, the government
imposes a constant cap on emissions, implying that there is a fixed-common property externality.
Each newborn leads to a situation where more people share the same total amount of available
emissions and living standards decrease. The authors find that, under certain assumptions, the
population externality is quite large.
In this paper we use a simplified version of the model by de la Croix and Doepke (2003),
integrating climate change dynamics and its effects on the economy. Compared to Harford (1998)
we design an education policy to control fertility since a policy which directly tax each children
may be controversial for policymakers. With respect to Bohn and Stuart (2015), we analyse
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the transitional dynamics of the endogenous fertility model and we improve upon the climatic
module partially following Golosov et al. (2014). We calibrate our model in order to assess to
which extent an education policy contribute to climate policy, compared to a benchmark climate
policy that has laissez-faire fertility choices. In particular, considering endogenous fertility, we
ask how much family size should decrease as part of climate change policy and whether an
education policy affecting fertility is an efficient mitigation mechanism. Our results shows that
endogenous demography increases the social cost of carbon compared to the classical literature
on climate change and the economy, suggesting that this dimension is extremely important. In
this setting, a climate policy is not sufficient to internalize the externality induced by endogenous
population; including a policy directed to increase global education, instead, help in reaching a
win-win outcome: the carbon tax is optimal and a subsidy on education decreases fertility level
helping in lowering emissions and, at the same time, boosting economic growth.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we outline a few stylized facts
on economic growth, fertility, education and climate change that provide some background for
the analysis. In Section 3.3 we clarify the links between fertility, education and climate change.
In Section 3.4 we present a model of endogenous fertility decisions with quality-quantity trade-
off features to which we add a climate module. Section 3.5 outlines the calibration procedure.
In Section 3.6 we describe the scenarios and the policies implemented. In Section 3.7 we present
the results. In Section 3.8 we perform a sensitivity analysis on key parameters. Section 3.9
concludes with some indications of future research avenues.
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3.2 Stylized Facts
The United Nations calculates that there are more than 7 billion living humans on earth nowa-
days (UN, 2015b), yet 200 years ago we numbered less than 1 billion. This is the most conspic-
uous fact about world population growth: for thousands of years, population grew only slowly,
but in recent centuries it has jumped dramatically.
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Figure 3.2.1: Population: Estimates and Projections. Source: History Database of the Global Environ-
ment (HYDE) until 1950. UN Population Division after 1950, including the UN projections after 2016.
As Figure 3.2.1 shows, historical population trend is non-linear. The increase in world
population between 1900 and 2000 was three times greater than the entire previous history of
humanity. The world faced an increase from 1.5 to 6.1 billion of people in just 100 years (Roser
and Ortiz-Ospina, 2017). Nevertheless, there is a high degree of uncertainty as concern future
population growth, which depends on assumptions about specific demographic variables. In
particular, the factors governing population dynamics are mortality rates, migration and most
importantly fertility which is the most uncertain variables. Depending on the scenario considered
(low, medium, high) and the corresponding fertility pattern assumed, we may end up by 2100
between 8 (low variant scenario) and 16 (high variant scenario) billion of people (UN, 2015b).
Currently, the world population continues to grow though more slowly than in the recent past.
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Figure 3.2.2: Medium Variant Scenario. Panel (a) represents Total Population and Panel (b) Population
Growth. Annual Estimates and Projections (2000-2100). Medium Variant. Source UN Population Division.
Figure 3.2.2 is based on the medium variant scenario and considers the evolution of historical
population in the last 20 years and its projections until 2100. The results presented in Panels
(a) and (b), which report, respectively, total population and population growth rate, assumes a
decline of fertility for countries where large families are still prevalent, as well a slight increase
of fertility in several countries where women have fewer than two live births on average over
a lifetime. Survival rate are projected to increase in all countries as death rates are expected
to continuously declining. The uncertainty surrounding projected fertility and mortality rates
is addressed by the United Nation using statistical methods to test the plausibility of each
outcome. The UN (2017) analysis has concluded that, with a certainty of 95 per cent, the size
of global population will stand between 8.4 and 8.7 billion in 2030, between 9.4 and 10.2 billion
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in 2050 and between 9.6 and 16 billion in 2100. Concluding, it is quite certain that the size of
population will increase, there is a roughly probability that world’s population could stabilize
or even begin to fall before 2100.
Several papers in the economic literature (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2005) study popu-
lation trends and factors governing the demographic transition. Mortality is highly affected by
the improvement of living standards and the availability of public health systems. Nevertheless,
considering that mortality rates are declining all over the world and that their future trends
are less uncertain, the main variables to study is fertility. On the one hand, fertility choices
are influenced by the use of contraceptives: to realize a substantial reductions in fertility it is
essential to invest in reproductive health and family planning, particularly in the least developed
countries where the need for such policies seems extremely important. On the other hand, de-
veloped countries show lower fertility rates not only as a result of easier access to contraceptive
methods, but also because of different stage of development. If we plot fertility against income
per capita at the global level, we can see that the two variable are negatively correlated.
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Figure 3.2.3: Fertility Rates and GDP per capita. Source: GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) is
taken from the WDI database, World Bank; Fertility Rates are taken from United Nation Population Division
database.
Figure 3.2.3 shows that stylized fact. There are many drivers behind this relationship and
we can find several explanations: first, the opportunity cost of child-rearing is high in developed
countries, especially for women (Jones and Tertilt, 2009); second, if women are better educated
tend to have less (or none) children, matching their desired family size (UN, 2017). Finally, a
symptom of economic growth is that parents substitute quantity for quality of children (Becker
et al., 1990; Becker and Barro, 1988; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003). In this regard, Figure 3.2.4
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correlates education (proxied by average years of schooling) and income per capita.
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Figure 3.2.4: Fertility Rates and Education. Source: Fertility Rates are taken from United Nation
Population Division database.; average hours of education in 2010 are taken from the Barro and Lee database.
Figure 3.2.5 shows that countries with the higher hours spent in education are those present-
ing lower fertility rate. This correlation suggests that influencing education could be effective
to lower fertility rates while boosting economic growth.
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Figure 3.2.5: GDP Per Capita and Education. Source: GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) is taken
from the WDI database, World Bank; average hours of education in 2010 are taken from the Barro and Lee
database.
Finally, to clarify the relationship between economy, population and environment, we con-
sider historical emission data. In order to understand the links between those dimensions, we
rely on a simplified Kaya identity, which decomposes changes in CO2 emissions as follows:
CO2 ≡ P × GDP
P
× CO2
GDP
(3.2.1)
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Equation (3.2) states that CO2 emissions can be expressed as a product of the following
factors: population, P , income per-capita, GDPP , and carbon intensity (emission per unit of
energy consumed), CO2GDP . If we think about those three factors as the drivers of CO2 emissions,
we can learn something interesting.
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Figure 3.2.6: World Emissions (1960-2014) and Kaya’s decomposition (1960-2014).
Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (2015 Data), United Nation Population Division and World
Bank. Notes: CO2 emissions are emissions from fossil fuels and cement production. Carbon in tonnes is converted
to CO2 in tonnes using the conversion factor 3.664. GDP is constant, 2010 US dollars
.
Figure 3.2.6 shows that total CO2 emissions (solid line) almost tripled from 1960 to 2014.
Though the carbon intensity (dashed-dotted line) of the economy has been decreasing, there are
two counteracting forces: income per capita (dashed line) and population (dotted line). The
increases in possibilities of consumption boost emissions. The average per capita emissions, at
the world level, is 4.5 tonnes while in the United States is around 18 tonnes; in poor countries
the picture is different: for example in Africa the per capita emissions are around 1.20 tonnes
(International Energy Statistics). Figure 3.2.6 shows that population is one driver of emissions.
Since most of the future population growth will occur in developing countries, this will imply
that the most populous countries will be at the same time the one fastest growing and therefore
with growing level of consumption-per capita and emissions. The latest projections by the World
Bank (WBG, 2017) state that the emerging market and developing economies are anticipated to
grow 4.1 percent faster than advanced economies during the year 2018/2019 and that probably
this will be the trend also in the future.
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3.3 Fertility, Education and Climate Change
The model described in this work is a dynamic model. Therefore, our results will be influenced
by both the relationships we imposed when building the model and the time dimension. The aim
of this section is to highlight the links between the most significant variables, namely fertility,
investment in education, income and emissions.
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Figure 3.3.1: Links between fertility, the economy and climate change
Figure 3.3.1 gives an intuition about the main channels of the model. The arrows describe
the direction of causality. We specify how we model the impact of each variables on the other one
(positively or negatively) to replicate the stylized facts and evidence. Income and emissions are
expressed per parents. Population and cumulative emissions, instead, are aggregates. Investment
in education are expressed per child. Damages are represented as percentage loss in gdp. The
relationship between income, emissions and damages is the “core” of climate-economy models:
an increase in income boosts emissions, causing damages which in turn (negatively) impact
“gross” income itself. Economic damages or impacts of climate change, is the thorniest issue in
climate-change economics. These estimates are indispensable for making sensible decisions about
the appropriate balance between costly emissions reductions and climate damages. However,
providing reliable estimates of the damages from climate change over the long run has proven
extremely difficult. In our model we follow Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013).
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In Figure 3.3.1 this last relationship is represented by light-gray variables, which are included
in a dashed circle. We add endogenous population’s dynamics in this context. In the top-right of
Figure 3.3.1 fertility choice affects total population where obviously higher fertility corresponds
to larger population, abstracting from mortality. Moreover, fertility itself (negatively) impacts
income: parents decide between time spent working or raising children. The more children they
have, the less they work. Finally, investment in education (positively) affect income (increas-
ing human capital) and the higher the income is, the more parents invest in their children’s
education.
The key contribution is the clear connections between economic, climatic and demographic
variables. Population is a determinant of emissions. An increase in fertility boost emissions
even if, at the same time, it reduces income allowing emissions to partially decrease. Therefore
fertility is a indirect driver of climate change. To which extent it is an open question, addressed
in this paper.
3.4 An Endogenous Fertility Model
We consider a model featuring the trade-off between quality and quantity of children. The
Unified Growth Theory (Galor and Weil, 2000; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003) has put such
a trade-off at the heart of the explanation of long-run growth and development. We then
incorporate into this framework a climate module that enables us to investigate fertility decisions
and its effect on climate change. As in standard growth models, variables are expressed in
intensive form. In the present case we normalize by the number of parents Nt. We take all
adults to be parents, even if it needs not to be the case in practice. We assume that only
the current generation of parents work, whereas children are inactive. Thus, lt = Lt/Nt is the
employment rate and Lt is the total labor force; qt = Qt/Ntis output per parent and Qt is
gross aggregate output; ct = Ct/Nt is consumption per parent and Ct is aggregate consumption;
st = St/Nt is education expenditures per parent and St are aggregate education expenditures.
Thus, upper case letters denote aggregate variables.
3.4.1 Demographics
One period lasts 30 years in our model. Results will be expressed in terms of variables per
period, so that aggregates are multiplied by M , where M = 30. Within a period, parents are of
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age 15-45, the range that correspond to the fertility period of a woman. Total population, Pt,
is given by:
Pt = Nt−1 +Nt + Nt+1 (3.4.1)
where old parents are represented by Nt−1, the current generation of parents is given by Nt and
the future generations of parents Nt+1. The size of the generation in the next period, Nt+1, is
multiplied by  = 12 , as babies are born uniformly over the period.
2 Given fertility ft, the next
generation’s size (number of parents) is:
Nt+1 = ftNt (3.4.2)
3.4.2 Production technology
The economy produces one homogeneous good whose price is normalized to one. The linear
technology is defined as
Qt = ωtHt (3.4.3)
where Qt is the production function determined by Ht which is human capital and ωt the
exogenous level of technology. Technology evolves according to:
ωt+1/ωt = ωˆ (3.4.4)
Productivity growth ωˆ is assumed to be constant and exogenous.3 Following Lucas (1988),
aggregate human capital is given by Ht = htLt, so that the labor input is expressed in quality-
adjusted or efficiency units. Substituting in (3.4.3) yields:
Qt = ωthtLt (3.4.5)
Gross output per parent is given by:
qt = ωthtlt (3.4.6)
where, as noted, lt is the employment rate and ht the “quality” of workers. Letting wt be
the wage rate, expressed in per quality workers, firms are assumed to maximize profits in a
competitive environment:
2 is the expected value of a uniform distribution.
3To keep the framework simple we do not model human capital accumulation.
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pit = qt − wthtlt (3.4.7)
The optimality conditions imply:
ωt = wt (3.4.8)
Wages are equated to the marginal productivity of workers. The dynamics of wages is governed
by the evolution of the technology, which is exogenous.
3.4.3 Preferences
Our representation of the households sector follows de la Croix and Doepke (2003). Parents make
decisions concerning the level of consumption ct, the number of children, ft and the expenditure
in education, st. As their income increases, the level of education expenditures increase, as
parents can afford more education. At the same time, the number of children for each family
decreases, because rearing children is time costly, i.e. there is an opportunity cost in terms of
earned wage.
The economy is composed by infinite overlapping generations who live for two periods: child-
hood and parenthood. Generations overlap as, at each point in time, two different generations
are alive. Figure 3.4.1 shows how generations appear over the period. The superscript represents
the period in which a generation was born and the subscript the period in which the generation
is alive.
Figure 3.4.1: Overlapping Generations
It is assumed here that adults do not save for their future consumption when old, but they
save in terms of current consumption in order to provide education to their children. As said,
adults are the only active agents. The preferences of each generation of parents t are represented
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by the following logarithmic utility function, ut:
ut = ln(ct) + γln(ftht+1) (3.4.9)
where ct is consumption per parent, γ > 0 is the weight attached to children in the utility
function, ft is the fertility level chosen by parents and ht+1 represents the human capital, i.e.
the quality of children.4 Following de la Croix and Doepke (2003), the level of human capital of
children, ht+1 is determined by:
ht+1 = (δ + st)
η (3.4.10)
we assume that all children are endowed with an exogenous positive level of quality captured by
parameter δ > 0 and interpreted as compulsory education; η ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of human
capital to education. The variable st is the investment choice of parents in the education of
their children.5 The level of human capital of children is an increasing strictly concave function
of parental investment in children’s education, so that ∂ht+1∂st > 0 and
∂2ht+1
∂2st
< 0. Notice
that equation (3.4.10) does not depend on the level of human capital of parents, ht. Parents
can transmit wealth to children only by providing them with education.6 Looking at equation
(3.4.10), we can think of δ as compulsory education which is provided for free: if parents decide
not to invest in the quality of their children, δ guarantees a minimum level of quality.
Parents are endowed with one unit of time which they allocate between child rearing and
labor force participation. All parents supply one unit of labour inelastically. Their budget
constraint is:
ct + stft = wthtlt (3.4.11)
where total income earned wthtlt is spent in consumption and in education st multiplied by
4Notice that parents do not care about their children’s well being, as would be in case of dynastic altruism.
Instead, in this formulation, parents value directly the future human capital of their children. In other words,
altruism is limited to one generation. Following Becker et al. (1973) and Galor and Weil (2000) this form of
’imperfect altruism’ is called joy of giving or warming-glow.
5We have in mind college education: parents have to support their children economically, as long as the course
of study does not end. That means, investment in education absorbs resources from parents’ income. Belley and
Lochner (2007) employing NLSY97 data, demonstrate that family income is an important determinant of college
attendance and quality of college.
6There are no financial bequests as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1985) or Becker and Barro (1988).
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fertility ft. The labour supply, lt is inelastic, given by:
lt = 1− φft (3.4.12)
where ft is the number of children and φ is the time per child. Notice that the time parents
spend raising their offespring, φft < 1, is deducted from labour supply. Parents maximize their
utility (3.4.9) subject to the budget constraint (3.4.11), definition (3.4.10) and condition (3.4.12).
Substituting (3.4.12) into (3.4.11) eliminates lt. In turn, using the resulting budget constraint
and definition (3.4.10) into the objective function yields an optimization problem with st and
ft as decision variables. The necessary conditions can be manipulated to yield the following
closed-form expressions for optimal fertility and education expenditures:
ft =
(1− η)γwtht
(φwtht − δ)(1 + γ) (3.4.13)
st =
ηφwtht − δ
1− η (3.4.14)
Plugging these expressions in (3.4.10) and (3.4.11) yields the following closed-form expressions
for optimal human capital and consumption:
ht+1 =
[
η(φhtwt − δ)
1− η
]η
(3.4.15)
ct =
htwt
1 + γ
(3.4.16)
Notice that all the optimal levels of the problem’s choice variables (3.4.13)-(3.4.16) are functions
of the wage adjusted by labour quality, wtht, and of parameters η, δ, φ and γ.
7 In particular,
equations (3.4.13) and (3.4.14) can be studied to see if our model is able to capture the quality-
quantity children’s trade-off highlighted by Becker et al. (1973). Equation (3.4.14) shows that
parents decide not to invest in education if their wage falls below or is equal to a certain threshold.
Specifically, if wtht ≤ δηφ then:
st = 0 (3.4.17)
ft =
γ
φ(1 + γ)
(3.4.18)
7See Appendix 3.B for the first order conditions of the problem.
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If instead wtht >
δ
ηφ we obtain the interior solution shown in equations (3.4.13)-(3.4.14). If we
consider the impact of htwt on ft and st we see that:
∂ft
∂wtht
=
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− η)γ[(φhtwt − δ)(1 + γ)]− φ(1 + γ)(1− η)γhtwt
[(φhtwt − δ)(1 + γ)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(3.4.19)
∂st
∂wtht
=
>0︷︸︸︷
ηφ
(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(3.4.20)
Concluding:
∂ft
∂wtht
< 0 (3.4.21)
∂st
∂wtht
> 0 (3.4.22)
When htwt >
δ
ηφ parents indeed substitute quantity for quality of children. Thus the present
model is able to generate the well-known quality-quantity trade-off.
3.4.4 Climate change
We now account for climate change into the above model of endogenous fertility choices. This
enables us to allow for both environmental and population externalities and to analyse the
interactions between demographic and climate policies. Following Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013),
we begin by distinguishing per parent gross output, qt, and net output, yt, the latter being
obtained after subtracting abatement, αt, and climate damages, dt. Net output is thus given
by:
yt = (1− dt)(1− at)qt (3.4.23)
where at is the abatement rate. In turn, abatement is defined as follow:
at = θ1µ
θ2
t (3.4.24)
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where µt is the endogenous emission control rate and θ1 and θ2 are parameters.
8 Climate
damages, dt are given by:
dt = 1− exp(−β1CEt) (3.4.25)
This formulation of climate damages follows Golosov et al. (2014), where damages depends on
cumulated historical emissions, CEt.
9 Wages have to be scaled for the gap between gross and
net output, so that equation (3.4.8) now reads:
w
′
t = (1− dt)(1− at)wt (3.4.26)
This is the new profit maximizing condition associated with the optimal choice of quality workers.
If damages and abatement impact output, wages will be affected too. The household budget
constraint (3.4.11) has to be revised such that:
ct + stft = yt (3.4.27)
where yt is output net of damages and abatement costs. Only a fraction of the carbon dioxide
(CO2) emitted stays in the atmosphere forever, thus inducing an increase in temperature (e.g.
climate change) and ultimately causing a loss of output. Cumulative emissions, CEt, evolve
over time according to:
CEt+1 = CEt + etMNt (3.4.28)
where CEt+1 represents cumulative emissions in period t + 1, given by cumulated emissions in
period t, CEt, plus emissions per parents, et, multiplied by the total number of parents, Nt,
and by M = 30, the number of years within a period. We are thus tracking the total stock of
emissions per period. Cumulative emissions affect damages according to (3.4.25). Therefore,
both emissions and fertility choices affect indirectly damages through their effect on cumulative
emissions. Equation (3.4.28) represents the channel through which fertility decisions impact
cumulative emissions and via equations (3.4.23) and (3.4.25) the whole economy.
Finally, emissions per parent, et, are proportional to gross output per parent and are reduced
by abatement via the emission control rate:
8To obtain total abatement costs multiply equation (3.4.24) by gross output per parents, qt, which yields a
convex abatement cost function in abatement levels.
9Compared to Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) we do not temperature dynamics, thus simplifying the climate
module.
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et = σtqt(1− µt) (3.4.29)
where σt represents the carbon intensity of the economy which is taken to exogenously decline
at a certain rate as in Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013).
3.5 Calibration
We define a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) of this economy which serves the main purpose
of calibrating five parameters (η, δ, γ, φ, ωˆ) and three variables (N1, ω1, h1) for the first period.
Calibration is discussed at length in the following subsection.
3.5.1 Balanced Growth Path
In this model economy a BGP is a path along which the growth factor of the human capital,
hˆ, and the growth factor of the exogenous technology level, ωˆ, are constant. A “hat” denotes
growth rates of variables. The dynamic system is governed by two difference equations:
Λ(ht+1, ht, ωt) = ht+1 −
[
η(φhtwt − δ)
1− η
]η
(3.5.1)
Γ(ωt+1, ωt) = ωt+1 − ωˆωt (3.5.2)
where in equation (3.5.2), the growth factor of technology ωˆ is assumed to be exogenous and
constant. In the long-run the fixed level of free education δ is negligible.10 In this event (3.5.1)
reduced to:
hˆ = (ωˆ)
η
1−η (3.5.5)
Along the BGP, fertility, employment rate and the share of investments in education over output
10Nesting the production function (3.4.10), into equation (3.4.9), we see that preferences in this model are non
homothetic, i.e. Stone Geary Utility function. In particular, the exogenous positive threshold δ implies that good
st is income elastic. In a growing economy this means that parent will spend more than proportionally for st, as
income grows. Therefore, in equation (3.4.10), δ will become progressively irrelevant. When t → ∞ preferences
become homothetic. From equation (3.4.10) we rearrange as:
ht+1 = s
η
t
(
θ
st
+ 1
)η
(3.5.3)
lim t→∞ of equation (3.5.3):
ht+1 = s
η
t (3.5.4)
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are all constant, depending only upon the model’s parameters. Denoting with (x∗) constant
variables along the BGP, we have:
f∗ =
(1− η)γ
φ(1 + γ)
(3.5.6)
l∗ = (1− φf∗) (3.5.7)
Taking the ratio between (3.4.6) and (3.4.14) yields:
(
s
q
)∗
=
ηφ
(1− η)(1− φf∗) (3.5.8)
In addition:
sˆ = hˆωˆ (3.5.9)
We see that the growth factor of investments in education, sˆ is constant and equal to the growth
rate of the product between human capital and technology level, hˆωˆ, which are constant along
the BGP. Consumption is given by:
cˆ = hˆωˆ (3.5.10)
which shows that the growth factor of consumption, cˆ, is constant and equal to the growth
factors of the product between human capital and technology hˆωˆ. From equations (3.5.9) and
(3.5.10) we get:
sˆ = cˆ = hˆωˆ (3.5.11)
Along the BGP the growth factors of investment in education and of consumption are constant
and equal to the growth rate of the product between human capital and technology level.11
3.5.2 Calibration
The first year of our model is 2035 and each period lasts 30 years. We calibrate the initial
number of parents, N1 using equation (3.4.1). We start the first period (2020 − 2050) with 8
billion people. Thus P1 = 8 = N0 + N1 + 0.5N2. In the 30 years before our starting date,
11See Appendix 3.B for the above derivations.
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1990− 2020, the fertility rate was around 33 % implying N0 = N1/(1 + 0.33). In the first period
of our model, population growth is about 25 %. Thus:
N2 = (1 + 0.25)N1 (3.5.12)
which, together with equation (3.4.1), yields:
8 =
N1
1 + 0.33
+N1 + 0.5(1 + 0.25)N1 (3.5.13)
Solving for the initial number of parents we obtain N1 equal to 3.5 billion parents: N1 = 3.5.
In the literature φ, the time-cost of children, is between 15% and 30% (Haveman and Wolfe,
1995; Knowles, 1999; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003). We set φ = 0.2, implying that parents
spend about 20 % of their time raising children. We make the assumption that, in the long-run,
fertility is equal to one, i.e. f∗ = 1. Recalling that fertility in our model represents number of
children per parent, in the long-run each couple will have two children and total population will
stabilize around its replacement level. Considering f∗ = 1, the share of education expenditures
over output in equation (3.5.8) becomes constant:
s
q
=
ηφ
(1− η)(1− φ) (3.5.14)
We take the ratio sq equal to 0.2, meaning that parents spend on average 20% of their income
in the education of children. 12
Given our assumptions on fertility and education expenditure share, together with the im-
puted value of φ, we determine η equal to 0.445. This value is in the range of estimates of returns
from education (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003). Substituting for the values of φ, η and f∗ = 1
we can solve for the parameter representing the preference of parents for children, γ = 0.5625.
From equation (3.5.5):
hˆωˆ = (ωˆ)
1
1−η (3.5.15)
A long run output growth of 60% per parent implies ωˆhˆ = 1.6; together with the assumed value
of η we find the growth factor of the technology level to be ωˆ = 1.24. This is consistent with
the growth of GDP per capita rate in 2016 reported by the World Bank national accounts data.
12These expenditures in education are relative to tertiary education. The average of household’s expenditure
in education for OECD countries is even higher (30%).
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According to the United Nations database on population, instead, the fertility rate in the first
period is equal to f1 = 1.25. Then, from (3.4.12), we calculate the initial value of the employment
rate, l1 = 0.75. The initial value of per parent output is calculated as q1 = Q1/N1, so it is the
fraction between Q1, gross output in the initial period and N1, the number of parents in the
initial period. We know that N1 = 3.5 billion whereas the value for Q1 = 75.54 trillions of dollars
is taken from the World Bank database. This yields the ratio 0.0216 million of dollars. From
equation (3.4.6) we then obtain q1/l1 = ω1h1 = 0.0288 million of dollars. Next, substituting
all known values in equation (3.4.13) we are able to isolate δ which is equal to 0.00115 million
dollars. The value of δ is the public expenditure of governments in education, meaning the
minimum level granted by the institutions. Substituting the optimal expression for s in (3.4.16)
into (3.4.10) it is possible to determine the initial level of children quality, h1 = 0.08286 where
we have assumed ω0h0 = ω1h1.
13 Finally, from the production function (3.4.6) we obtain the
initial level of technology equal to ω1 = 0.34730.
We now turn to the calibration of the climate module. Total world industrial emissions from
fossil fuels, Et, were in 2015 equal to 36 GtCO2 (giga tonnes), so that E1 = 0.036 TtCO2
(tera tonnes). Emissions per parent, et, are given by Et/Nt. Since N1 = 3.5 billions, we obtain
e1 = E1/N1 = 0.010 KtCO2 (kilo tonnes) per parent per year. Assuming now µ = 0, from
(3.4.29) we can calculate the initial value of σ1 = e1/q1 = 0.463. Thus 0.538 tCo2 per thousand
euros is the initial level of carbon intensity of the economy. In the very long-run we impose µ = 0,
implying that we assume no abatement due to improvements in carbon-saving technology and
past climate policy.
The last step is to calibrate the parameters of abatement and damage functions. To this end
we note that the pre-industrial level of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere was 280 ppmv
of carbon (see Chapter 8.3.2 of IPCC, 2014), which corresponds to 2.17 TtCO2. Doubling this
value may lead to irreversible climate events due to the subsequent increase in temperature.
The IPCC (2014) Chapter 6, page 472 states that about 50% of a CO2 increase will be removed
from the atmosphere within 30 years, and a further 30% will be removed within a few centuries.
The remaining 20% will stay in the atmosphere for many thousands of years depending on the
amount of carbon emitted. Nevertheless scientist are uncertain regarding these percentages:
Archer et al. (2009) suggest that between 20% and 35% of CO2 remains in the atmosphere for
centuries. To calibrate β1 we assume that about 30% of cumulated emissions remain in the
13The quality of children is a function of the level of education obtained. Moreover, this will affect the future
wage the children will be able to earn.
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atmosphere for thousands of years. The amount of cumulated emissions necessary to double the
concentration level of CO2 in the atmosphere is equal to 2.17 TtCO2/0.30 = 7.23 TtCO2. So we
need to emit about 7.23 TtCO2 in order to double the concentration level of this pollutant in the
atmosphere. If that happens, we may reach a temperature increase of at least 3 degrees relative
to pre-industrial levels. Early estimates projected that a doubling of atmospheric concentration
would yield damages equal to few percentage points of GDP. In his paper, Tol (Tol, 2009)
collects the most recent impact estimates of climate change on GDP. Depending on temperature
increase, we may have a loss in GDP between 1% and 5%. For all these reasons we impose that
doubling concentration level in the atmosphere may cost up to 3% of world GDP. We calibrate
β1 by solving (3.4.25), i.e. exp(β1CE) = 1 − d = 0.07 or exp(7β1) = 1 − 0.03 = 0.97, which
yields β1 = 0.0042.
Following Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013), suppose now that 100% of abatement costs equals
7% of aggregate GDP and that the abatement function (3.4.24) is quadratic, so that θ2 = 2.
This in turn implies θ1 = 0.07, where we have assumed, as said, that µ = 0. World cumulative
emissions between 1750 and 2011 amount to 405 GtC, corresponding to 1.48 TtCO2 (IPCC
(2014), p. 474). All parameters and initial values of the model variables are listed in Table 3.5.1
and Table 3.5.2 respectively.
Parameters Description Value
αt Welfare Weights 0.8
γ1 Preference for children 0.5625
φ Opportunity cost of children 0.2
η Elasticity of human capital to education 0.445
δ Compulsory school 0.00115
wˆ Long-run economic growth 1.24
β1 Exponent in damage equation 0.0042
θ1 Abatement Coefficient 0.07
θ2 Abatement Exponent 2
Table 3.5.1: List of Parameters
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Parameters Description Value
N1 Number of Parents [bn] 3.5
q1 Output [mn $/per parents yr] 0.0216
f1 Fertility [children per parents] 1.25
(s/q)1 Investment in education [fraction of per parents output] 0.2
l1 Employment rate [FTE per parents] 0.75
w1 wage/labor productivity [K$/labourer] 0.34730
w1h1 wage/labor productivity adjusted by quality [K$/labourer] 0.0288
h1 human capital 0.08286
σ1 Emission Intensity [tCO2/1000 $ per parents] 0.463
e1 Emissions [KtCo2/per parents] 0.010
CE1 Cumulative emissions [TtCo2] 1.48
Table 3.5.2: List of Initial Values
3.6 Scenarios and Policies
3.6.1 Social Welfare Functions and Ethics
Any economic model to estimate an optimal policy requires a social welfare function (SWF) to
evaluate the trade-offs the society faces in its policy choices. There are two main formulations
of SWFs in the climate change and endogenous fertility literature: the Millian SWF, which
considers the average utility of the representative agent and the Benthamite SWF, which values
the total utility distributed in the economy. These formulations represent two different ethical
approaches to value human population. Both SWFs have advantages and disadvantages, which
are well explored in the economic and philosophical literature on social choice and welfare.14
The paper by Scovronik et al. (2016) considers the population ethics in relation to climate
change mitigation. They notice that integrated models of climate and the economy, like DICE
(Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013), usually consider a Benthamite SWF. Large set of papers dealing
with optimality in endogenous fertility models, instead, attribute a Millian objective to the
Social Planner.15 In this paper we chose for simplicity to follow the literature on endogenous
fertility and we adopt the Millian’s SWF, V of this form:
V =
T∑
t=1
αtut (3.6.1)
where αt are the welfare-weights, i.e. the discount factors of utilities between generations
and T = 21 periods. The welfare weights are the most uncertain parameters. Their estimates
are not unique and the literature is mixed: the values vary between αt = 0.970 (Nordhaus,
14See Razin and Yuen (1995); Blackorby et al. (2002, 2005) among others.
15See Groezen et al. (2003), Zhang (2003) and Zhang and Zhang (2007), among many other papers.
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1993), αt = 0.98 (Weitzman, 2007) and αt = 0.999 (Stern, 2007). Nordhaus (2014) and Gerlagh
et al. (2017) show that the discount factor between generations is important in determining the
social cost of carbon. In the following simulations, after adjusting for the number of years in
each periods (30 years), we assume αt = 0.8.
The first scenario is the Baseline run, where emissions are uncontrolled. It is the benchmark
scenario, against which the outcomes of other scenarios are compared. Then, the second scenario
is the Climate Policy run, in which the climate policy is optimally determined. Finally, the third
scenario is the Climate Change and Education Policy run, where a mixed climate-education
policy is implemented. More precisely:
(a) Baseline (“BAU”): it projects the levels and growth of economic and environmental vari-
ables as would occur without any policy. It does not consider social desirability of income
distribution across generation over time.
(b) Climate Policy (“clim. policy”): it describes an equilibrium where consumers maximize
their own welfare without considering climate change. In this context, the emission control
rate µ is optimal and an optimal carbon price, i.e. carbon tax is determined. This scenario
shows us the effect of a climate policy in an endogenous fertility model.
(c) Climate Change and Education Policy (“educ. & clim. policy”): considering the same
social welfare function as in (3.6.1), a mixed climate-education policy is optimally deter-
mined. This scenario describes a double set of instruments aimed at mitigating emissions,
directly through the climate policy and indirectly via the education policy, which will affect
both fertility and emissions.
3.6.2 Education Policy
The idea of a global education policy aimed at increasing quality of children through investment
in education is grounded in the reality: the fourth Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)16
is to “ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning”. The SDG
framework does not distinguish between developed and developing countries, so our model seems
a good tool to test the effect of such a policy. Moreover there is extensive evidence (Becker et al.,
2010) that fertility and education are negatively correlated, in particular women’s education.
16The Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015a) replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which
ended in 2015.
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So an education policy may obtain two different goals: (1) it lowers the number of children per
woman; (2) it may helps in decreasing future emissions.
To implement the education policy, the budget constraint in equation (3.4.11) is modified as
follows:
ct + [(1 + τt)st] ft = wtht(1− φft) + Zt (3.6.2)
where τt represents the education policy and Zt are the lump-sum transfers from the government,
chosen such that Zt = τtstft. In Appendix 3.B we compute the new first order conditions which
will be used to determine the optimal τt. The policy variable τt is a “free” variable, meaning we
do not know a priori if it will be optimal to tax or to subsidize education in our context.
3.7 Results
In this section we present the results of our simulations for some key variables. In particular,
to understand the implications of each policy on demographic variables, we report the paths of
fertility, F and total population, P . Then, we show the projections for two economic variables,
income net of damages and abatement costs, GDP and investment in education, EDU EXP .
On the climate side, we consider emissions per parent, E the emission control rate, µ aggregate
cumulative emissions, CE and the education policy variable, τ . When possible we discuss about
the implications of each policy on the social cost of carbon, SCC and the carbon price, CP .
The inclusion of an overlapping generation structure with endogenous fertility and education
choices is non standard in the climate change economics literature. Here below, in Figures 3.7.1-
3.7.3 we show the baseline (solid lines) in comparison with the climate policy scenario (dashed
lines). Then, in Figures 3.7.5-3.7.7 we carefully investigate the implications of a climate change
and education policy scenario (dotted lines), depicting for each variable the three scenarios to-
gether. Finally, Figure 3.7.4 and Figure 3.7.8 discuss the implications of endogenous population
on the social cost of carbon and the carbon price. Moreover, Figure 3.7.8 shows the resulting
optimal policy on education.
The model runs for several periods. In the following figures, we show the results until the
end of this century. We are dealing with a global model with global policies, so the choice of
representing this length of time is grounded in the fact that such policies need many decades to
be effective.
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Figure 3.7.1: Simulation’s Results. Panel (a): Fertility. Panel (b): Total Population.
.
As concern the demographic variables, Figure 3.7.1 in Panel (a) reports fertility. Baseline
fertility, FBAU is decreasing and by the end of this century it stabilizes at one children per parent.
In Panel (b) total population, PBAU reaches 14 billion of people17 and then it stabilizes in the
subsequent periods as a result of constant fertility. Under the climate policy scenario, fertility,
F clim.policy and total population, P clim.policy are higher compared to the BAU. An explanation
can be found in de la Corix and Gosseries (2012). They demonstrate that, in an endogenous
fertility model with a climate externality, a tax on emissions encourages agents to substitute
some of the polluting production with tax-free activities, such as procreation. If this intuition
is correct, we expect income to be lower in the climate policy scenario.
17Consistently with the medium-variant projections of the United Nation (UN, 2017).
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Figure 3.7.2: Simulation’s Results. Panel (c): Income net of damage and abatement costs. Panel (d):
Investment in education.
.
In Figure 3.7.2, an increasing income, as reported in Panels (c), is associated with growing
investment in education, as depicted in Panel (d). This is again consistent with the quality-
quantity trade-off mechanism described in Section 3.4.3. The effect of the climate policy is
to lower income, GDP clim.policy compared to the baseline, GDPBAU . Due to climate policy
parents are poorer, meaning that their income is diminished by the carbon tax, and so fertility
increases. As parent have more children and less economic resources at disposal, they decide to
invest less in the education of their offspring, as shown by EDU EXP clim.policy. The climate
policy emphasizes the quality-quantity mechanism of our model. So far, the model matches
several stylized facts described in Section 3.2. The next figures focus on the climate variables.
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Figure 3.7.3: Simulation’s Results. Panel (e): Emissions. Panel (f): Emission control rate.
.
In the baseline run emissions, EBAU are exogenous, meaning that the link between damages
and emissions is not considered as well as the impact of climate change on output. In Figure 3.7.3
in Panel (e), the path of baseline emissions is standard: they increase through time, stabilizing
by the end of this century. In the climate policy scenario, instead, emissions, Eclim.policy are lower
compared the baseline. They slightly increase in the first periods and then decrease, reaching
almost zero by the end of this century. When the climate policy is implemented, the level
of abatement is endogenously determined by the model. Panel (f) shows the emission control
rate, µclim.policy which in the first period is around 20%. Though the model never reaches full
abatement, i.e. 100%, as time passes by and the economic costs of climate change increase,
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optimal abatement increases too and the model reaches 80% of abatement by 2100.
The results in Figures 3.7.1-3.7.3 are a consequence of the inclusion of the endogenous fertility
channel. The decrease in emissions due to abatement entails a loss in terms of income for future
generations. This loss is even intensified by the quality-quantity mechanism as the decrease in
income induces parents to invest less in the education of their children, negatively affecting future
economic growth. In such a context fertility is higher and consequently the size of population
increases too, boosting future emissions.
Our model shows that a climate policy induces an indirect effect on fertility which may de-
teriorate the environment further in the long-run. Demographic patterns must be endogenously
modeled and proper climate policies should be designed to carefully take this dimension into
account. In order to offset the adverse effect of population on emissions, we need a second
instrument (Harford, 1998; Bohn and Stuart, 2015). As also de la Corix and Gosseries (2012)
highlight, there are two possibilities to achieve lower emissions level: reducing production per
capita or containing future population size.
Before describing the mixed climate-education policy scenario, we report the social cost of
carbon and the carbon tax computed under the climate policy scenario.
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is an important output of integrated economic models of
climate change and economy. The SCC is defined as “the net present value of future damages
associated with one extra unit of emissions”. It is a measure of the social cost of emissions and
is important for policymakers to set the proper carbon price (or carbon tax). The carbon price
is defined as “the additional decrease in GDP when decreasing emissions by an additional unit
of CO2”. This is a concept that measures the market price of CO2 emissions. 18 The “optimal”
carbon price is the price on emissions that balances the incremental costs of reducing emissions
with the incremental benefits of reducing climate damages. In an optimal regime, the carbon tax
coincides with the social cost of carbon (Nordhaus, 2014). The SCC is affected by the discount
factor, i.e. the welfare wights, attached to future generations. In Section 3.8 we will perform
some sensitivity analysis on this parameter, αt. In the current simulations, the discount factor
is imposed equal to 0.993, a value which lies in the range of estimates usually considered in the
literature (Gerlagh et al., 2017). According to Stern’s view (Stern, 2007), we give a high weight
to future generations. Every period in our model is made by 30 years, so the welfare weights
18In a market environment, such as a cap-and-trade regime, the carbon prices would be the trading price of
carbon emission permits. In a carbon-tax regime, these would be the harmonized carbon tax among participating
regions (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013).
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Figure 3.7.4: Simulation’s Results. Panel (g): The Social Cost of Carbon and carbon price with endoge-
nous fertility. Panel (h): The Social Cost of Carbon and carbon price with exogenous fertility.
Figure 3.7.4 in Panel (g) shows the carbon prices, CP end.pop. and the social cost of carbon,
SCCend.pop. resulting in our model of endogenous fertility under a climate policy. The interesting
result is that the two measures do not coincide. The social cost of carbon in 2035 and 2065 is,
respectively, 75$ and 102$, while the corresponding carbon price is 30$ and 60$. The “gap” is
due to the presence of endogenous fertility. In order to test this intuition, we impose fertility to
be exogenous19. In Panel (h) we report the resulting SCCexog.pop. and SCCexog.pop. under the
same climate policy as before. Notice that carbon prices and the SCC coincide again.
19To impose exogenous fertility, we program and solve the model consecutively two times; after the first solving
we fix the level of fertility and we solve the model again. In this way we eliminate the effect of endogenous fertility
on carbon prices.
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The reason for the discrepancy between the SCC and the CP in Panel (g) is subtle and
needs more explanations. In the climate policy scenario with endogenous fertility, the choice
of agents about how many children to have is given. Since the planner cannot internalize
the effect of fertility on climate policy, she/he sets lower carbon prices with respect to the
SCC, as shown in Figure 3.7.4. This is a second − best solution and the result is driven by
the presence of endogenous fertility choices. The linkages between fertility and emissions can
be understood looking at some equations. In equation (3.4.28), fertility affects total number
of parents, which contribute in determining the level of cumulative emissions. The level of
atmospheric concentration of CO2 is responsible of damages due to increases in temperature,
meaning that cumulative emissions trigger climate change. Considering equation (3.4.29) the
effect of fertility on climate is even clearer, as the number of children impacts emissions through
the production function.
When choosing how many children to have, individuals do not consider the burden imposed
by each newborn on the environment. As (Harford, 1998; Bohn and Stuart, 2015) highlight,
there is a population externality problem. In this work we are not explicitly computing the
externality20. Nevertheless, we can clearly see, through simulations, that endogenous fertility is
driving the results. So, in a model of climate, economy and endogenous demography, a climate
policy is not sufficient to correct for all the externalities. Moreover, the underlying quality-
quantity trade-off in the economic module even emphasize the effect of fertility and, as a matter
of fact, carbon prices should be halved as shown in Figure 3.7.4 in Panel (g).
In order to internalize the externality induced by endogenous fertility, we need a second
instrument, meaning a population policy. This is the aim of our third scenario where we imple-
ment a policy-mixed scenario, so a climate policy together with a demographic one. Instead of
directly taxing fertility as in Harford (1998); Bohn and Stuart (2015), we decrease the cost of
investment in education through a subsidy.21 This third scenario is called Climate Change and
Education Policy.22
In order to understand the improvements, if any, we depict together the baseline, the climate
policy scenario and the climate change and education policy scenario for each of our key variable.
20This is the aim of another paper, which is an extension of this chapter, see Gerlagh, Lupi and Galeotti (2018).
21The paper by Bauernschuster et al. (2016) explores the effect of a universal childcare on fertility. Their data
reveal that increases in public child care have significant positive effects on fertility. We are not dealing with child
care in our model. We are just considering the possible effect of a policy which increases education and its effect
on fertility choices (IIASA, 2014).
22Notice that the education policy is optimally computed, meaning that, through time, it can result in a tax
on education or in a subsidy. Anyway, we expect this second instrument to correct for the population externality,
so we expect it to be a subsidy.
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Figure 3.7.5: Simulation’s Results. Panel (a): Fertility. Panel (b): Total Population.
In Figure 3.7.5, Panel (a) optimal fertility, F educ.&clim.policy is lower compared both to the
baseline and the climate policy scenarios. Population, P educ.&clim.policy in Panel (b) peaks in
2065 and then stabilizes around 10 billion of people, so 4 billions of people less compared to
the other scenarios. This outcome is very important in terms of environment preservation and
sustainability. An instrument which indirectly affects fertility and then population, is effective
in diminishing population’s size. In the following figures we show the effects of this mixed policy
on income and investment in education.
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Figure 3.7.6: Simulation’s Results. Panel (c): Income net of damage and abatement costs. Panel (d):
Investment in education.
In Figure 3.7.6 Panel (c) income, GDP educ.&clim.policy doubles with respect to the baseline
and the climate policy scenarios. The result is still emphasized by the quality-quantity trade-off
underlying the model, as richer people with less children invest more in education. As a matter
of fact, In Panel (d) we notice that investment in education, EDU EXP educ.&clim.policy have
a similar trend to income. Coherently with the previous analysis, we now turn to the climate
variables.
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In Figure 3.7.7 Panel (e) optimal emissions, Eeduc.&clim.policy are lower compared to the
baseline case, but higher in the first two periods with respect to the climate policy scenario.
This is due to the increase in investment in education which boosts the quality, so human capital
of future adults. The consequent increase of output23 determines higher level of emissions in
the first two periods. Then, emissions decrease faster compared to the climate policy case as a
result of higher abatement, µeduc.&clim.policy as shown in Panel (f).
In Figure 3.7.7 Panel (g) we report the cumulative emissions, CE for each scenario. The
aim is to gain an intuition about the increase in temperature implied by each scenario. Accord-
ingly with the IPCC analysis (IPCC, 2014), 7 teraton of cumulated emissions in the atmosphere
correspond to an increase of 3 degrees Celsius with respect to pre-industrial level. Cumulative
emissions, CEBAU in Panel (g) shows that in the baseline scenario the temperature increase
is above 3 degrees Celsius by 2100. In the climate policy scenario, CEclim.policy, instead, cu-
mulative emissions stabilize at 5Tt while in the climate change and education policy scenario,
CEeduc.&clim.policy reach 4Tt. Though we cannot completely avoid an increase in temperature by
the end of the century, a mixed climate-population policies may help in decreasing the expected
boost in temperature and so climate change.
Then, population and fertility choices are important determinants of climate change. Policies
able to influence fertility, like an education policy, should be part of the discussion regarding
climate change mitigation and sustainability again. In the remind of this section, we analyze
the behavior of the optimal education policy together with carbon price and the social cost of
carbon.
23Looking at equation 3.4.5, human capital is an input in the production function.
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Figure 3.7.8: Simulation’s Results. Panel (h): Optimal tax on fertility. Panel (i): Optimal Carbon tax.
Figure 3.7.8 in Panel (h) reports the optimal subsidy24, τ educ.&clim.policy to education, which
induces parents to have less children and to invest more in their quality. As expected, In Figure
3.7.8 in Panel (i), the carbon prices, CP educ.&clim.policy coincide with the social cost of carbon,
SCCeduc.&clim.policy, as all the externalities in the model are internalized.25
The following section performs some sensitivity analysis on the discount factor to understand
how this will affect our results.
24Note that we define the optimal education policy a subsidy as in the optimization procedure the value assumed
by τ is negative. In Figure 3.7.8, instead, we report it as positive just for simplicity.
25Notice that the two measures diverge again after the third period. The explanation is the following: as soon
as the economy reaches full abatement (µt = 100%), there is no point in keep on increasing the carbon prices.
When emissions are equal to zero, the carbon price stays constant. From that point onwards the gap between the
social cost of carbon and carbon price is meaningless.
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3.8 Sensitivity Analysis
The literature on climate change economics always focuses on the discussion about some ethical
parameters assumed in IAMs model. Those parameters are difficult to estimate. As our model
is a welfare maximizing model, the agents in the model need to discount the future the same way
actual people do. Considering a range of values usually assumed in the literature, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis on the parameter representing the discount rate between generations, i.e.
the welfare weights. This parameter is important as influences the value of the social cost of
carbon.
As a first step we vary αt following the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
(Stern, 2007). Stern states that climate change is the greatest market failure ever seen, presenting
a unique challenge for economics. In his view the reaction to stop climate change should be
immediate. This, practically, correspond to impose a high tax on emissions since today. That
means, we give a high value to future generations. Then, we implement a median value as in
Weitzman (2007). Finally, we implement Nordhaus’ view Nordhaus (1993). Nordhaus argues
that the Stern Review exaggerates the effects of global warming because it uses a discount rate
that is well below the market rate of return on capital. We can say that Nordhaus’s belief in
choosing preference parameters for the social planner based on observed market rates of return is
equivalent to assign the preferences of a capitalist agents to the social planner. Table 3.8 below
resumes the welfare weights considered in the sensitivity analysis on the basis of the studies
cited above.
αt References
0.970 Nordhaus (1993)
0.980 Weitzman (2007)
0.999 Stern (2007)
Table 3.8.1: Sensitivity on the Welfare Weights.
The discount factors resumed in Table 3.8 need to be raised to 30, the number of years in
each period26. In the following figures we analyze how changes in the welfare weights affect the
carbon price, the social cost of carbon and the education subsidy under both the climate policy
scenario and the climate change and education scenario. The indices S, W and N refer to the
studies just cited.
26So, the initial values for the welfare weights are, respectively, αN = 0.4, αW = 0.545 and αS = 0.97, where
S, W and N represent the different ways of discounting.
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Figure 3.8.1: Sensitivity Analysis. Social Cost of Carbon and Carbon Price in the climate policy scenario.
Panel (a): Stern’s welfare weights. Panel (b): Weitzman’s welfare weights. Panel (c): Nordhaus’ welfare weights.
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In Figure 3.8.1, the gap between the social cost of carbon and the carbon price diminishes
(increases) the more (less) importance is given to present generations. In Panel (a) we consider
the Stern’s view (Stern, 2007). The social cost of carbon in that case is extremely high: it
starts from 240$ and by the end of the century is around 1000$; the initial carbon price is
150$ and stabilizes at 200$, after the second period. Then, the carbon price becomes constant
as the economy reaches full abatement. The Stern’s discount rate considers future generations
extremely important.
The less we care about future generations, instead, the lower is the social cost of carbon:
following this view, current generations should not pay a high price for damages due to climate
change. It is better to postpone the abatement of emissions: future generations will put more
effort and will pay a higher carbon price. This is the case in Figure 3.8.1 in Panel (b) and Panel
(c). Panel (c) represents the Weitzman’s view (Weitzman, 2007). The social cost of carbon is
21$ in the first period and its value increases until 100$ by the end of the century. The carbon
price, instead, is initially around 10$ and reaches 70$ by 2100. Finally, Panel (c) reports the
Nordhaus’ view (Nordhaus, 1993), where the importance given to future generations is even
lower. The social cost of carbon is initially 20$ and reaches 60$ by 2100. The carbon price in
the first period is equal to 15$ and then increases through time until 40$.
Finally, we conduct some sensitivity analysis considering the third scenario, namely the
climate change and education policy one. We consider again the SCC and the CP. Moreover we
report the optimal tax (subsidy) on education necessary to correct for the population effect on
emissions. Letting the welfare weights to vary as before, we obtain the results shown in Figure
3.8.2.
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Figure 3.8.2: Sensitivity Analysis. Panel (d): Social Cost of Carbon and Carbon Price in the Climate
Change and education policy scenario. Panel (e): Optimal Education Subsidy.
In Panel (d) we report the carbon prices. The mixed climate-education policy corrects for
all the externalities in the model. As a matter of fact, the carbon prices are optimal i.e. equal to
the social cost of carbon. The Stern’s view determines a high carbon prices since the first period.
In this case it is possible to clearly see that, as soon as the economy reaches full abatement, i.e.
zero emissions, the carbon price stays constant. As concern Weitzman’s and Nordhaus’ views,
the level of carbon prices diminishes the lower are the welfare weights considered. Figure 3.8.2 in
Panel (e), instead, reports the optimal subsidy to education τ . The higher is the concern for the
future, the higher is the subsidy to education. The subsidy internalizes the effect of endogenous
fertility choices on emissions, resulting in a lower fertility level (as shown in Figure 3.7.5, Panel
(a)).
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3.9 Conclusions and directions for future research
In a model of climate and economy, endogenous fertility is introducing another source of exter-
nality and increases the estimates of the social cost of carbon. Nevertheless, if there is only one
policy instrument to counteract climate change, namely a climate policy, carbon prices should be
halved compared to the social cost of carbon (second-best solution) to mitigate the adverse en-
dogenous fertility effect on emissions. Still, income per capita is lowered as a result of emissions
abatement. If, instead, we implement a mixed policy schemes where both the environmental
and demographic goals are simultaneously considered, we obtain interesting results in terms of
emission abatement, without penalizing per capita income. In this second case, it is optimal
to subsidize education: the result is a lower fertility compared to the baseline and the climate
policy scenarios. Moreover the double set of policies guarantee that we do not exceed the 2
degrees Celsius increase with respect to pre-industrial levels.
A first extension of our work would be to include pure altruism. So far, parents care only
about their children. A fully altruistic model, instead, is a dynastic model where each generation
acts as if it cares about all future generations. We expect this extension to produce a different
dynamics when designing our policies. Preliminary simulations show that a tax on fertility should
complement the subsidy on education as part of climate change policy. This will be a future
extension of our work. A further extension would be building a regional model with endogenous
population dynamics. Differentiating between ageing and young societies could help in designing
appropriate climate and demographic policies, discriminating according to each regions’ socio-
economic conditions. Most importantly, a regional model allows to consider migration flows. It
would be interesting to explore the channels through which climate uncertainty together with
demographic imbalances can boost the displacement of people not only to richer, but also to
environmentally safer countries. Notice that climate change is only one determinant of migration.
Nevertheless, we expect that the importance of this dimension will be growing in the nearest
future.
Concluding, this work is a first attempt to highlight the importance of population dynamics
in relation to climate change. Climate change economics should look at demographic change
and demographic policies as complementary to climate ones.
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Appendix
3.A Competitive equilibrium and optimality conditions
Consider first the model presented in Section 2.4.
Definition 3.A.1 Competitive Equilibrium without altruism. Given the initial values of popu-
lation N1, human capital h1 and technology ω1, an equilibrium consists of sequences of prices
{wt}, aggregate quantities {Nt}, and decision rules {ct, ft, st, ht+1, } such that:
1 the households’ decision rules ct,ft,st, ht+1, and ht+1 maximize utility (3.4.9) subject to
the constraints (3.4.10), (3.4.12) and (3.4.11);
2 the firm’s choice htlt maximizes profits;
3 the prices wt are such that markets clear, i.e., (3.4.12) holds;
4 aggregate variable Nt is given by (3.4.1)
The household optimal program is given by the following Lagrangean:
L = ln(ct) + γln(ftht+1)− λt[ct + stft − wtht(1− φft)]− ψt[ht+1 − (δ + st)η] (3.A.1)
where λt and ψt are the Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices) for the equations (3.4.10)-
(3.4.11)-(3.4.12). The optimality conditions for the choice variables ct, ht+1, st and ft respec-
tively are:
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1ct
= λt (3.A.2)
γ
ft
= λt(st + φhtwt) (3.A.3)
ηψt(δ + st)
η−1 = λtft (3.A.4)
γ
ht+1
= ψt (3.A.5)
Manipulation of these expression yields (3.4.13)-(3.4.16) in the text.
3.B Balanced growth path
Consider first the model presented in Section 3.4.
Definition 3.B.1 Balance Growth Path (BGP). A BGP in this economy is a path along which
the growth factor of the human capital, hˆ, and the growth factor of the exogenous technology
level, ωˆ, are constant.
Let δ = 0. If human capital h and technology ω grow at a constant factor along the BGP,
using (3.4.8) from (3.4.15) we obtain:
ht+1
ht
= hˆ =
(
ηφ
1− η
)η
ωηt h
η−1
t (3.B.1)
Solving for ωt yields:
ωt =
[
hˆ
(
ηφ
1− η
)−η
h1−ηt
] 1
η
(3.B.2)
Because the growth factor of technology ωˆ is constant, from (3.B.2) we have:
ωt+1
ωt
= ωˆ =
[
hˆ( ηφ1−η )
−η (ht+1)1−η
hˆ( ηφ1−η )
−η (ht)1−η
] 1
η
(3.B.3)
Which simplifies to:
ωˆ = hˆ
1−η
η (3.B.4)
And in turn:
hˆ = ωˆ
η
1−η (3.B.5)
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This shows that the growth factor of h is constant and is equal to the growth factor of exogenous
productivity ω raised to the power of η1−η .
By using equations (3.4.14) and (3.4.6) we obtain the ratio of education investment to output
is:
st
qt
=
ηφhtwt
(1− η)(htwtlt) (3.B.6)
Simplifying htwt and substituting out lt using equation (3.4.12) gives:
(
s
q
)∗
=
ηφ
(1− η)(1− φf∗) (3.B.7)
The ratio
(
s
q
)
is constant since f is constant as it is seen from (3.4.13) which, under δ = 0
reduces to the following:
ft =
(1− η)γhtwt
(φhtwt)(1 + γ)
(3.B.8)
or:
f∗ =
(1− η)γ
φ(1 + γ)
(3.B.9)
From equation (3.4.12) also the employment rate is constant:
l∗ = (1− φf∗) (3.B.10)
Consider now the growth factor of st. From equation (3.A.4) we have:
st+1
st
=
ht+1wt+1ηφ
1−η
htwtηφ
1−η
(3.B.11)
which simplifies to:
sˆ = hˆωˆ (3.B.12)
Hence the growth factor of investment in education is equal to the product of the growth factors
of children quality and technology level. From equation (3.4.16) we have that the growth factor
of consumption ct is also constant and equal to:
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ct+1
ct
=
ht+1wt+1
1+γ
htwt
1+γ
(3.B.13)
and therefore:
cˆ = hˆωˆ (3.B.14)
From equations (3.B.12) and (3.B.14) we finally have that:
sˆ = cˆ = hˆωˆ (3.B.15)
Along the BGP the growth factors of investment in education and of consumption are constant
and equal to the growth rate of the product between human capital and technology level.
3.C Education Policy
The idea is to consider the effect of an education subsidy on fertility choices and how this impact
on climate change. We modify the budget constraint in equation (3.4.11) and the new optimality
conditions are the following:
ft =
γhtwt(1− η)
(1 + γ) [φhtwt − δ(1 + τ1t)] (3.C.1)
and
st =
ηφwtht − δ(1 + τ1t)
(1 + τ1t)(1− η) (3.C.2)
The third scenario in Section 3.6 is implemented considering equations (3.C.1) when solving for
the optimal policies.
3.D Summary of model’s equations
3.D.1 Non-altruistic model
Social welfare and preferences
Wt =
T∑
t=1
αtut (3.D.1)
ut = ln(ct) + γ1ln(ftht+1) (3.D.2)
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Production technology; budget constraint; labor market condition; human capital, working age
group dynamics
qt = ωthtlt (3.D.3)
yt = ct + stft (3.D.4)
lt = 1− φft (3.D.5)
ht+1 = (δ + st)
η (3.D.6)
Nt+1 = ftNt (3.D.7)
Emissions net of abatement; cumulative emissions; damages; abatement; output net of damages
and abatement costs:
et = σtqt(1− µt) (3.D.8)
CEt+1 = CEt + etMNt (3.D.9)
dt = 1− exp(−β1CEt) (3.D.10)
at = θ1µ
θ2
t (3.D.11)
yt = exp(−β1CEt)(1− θ1µθ2t )qt (3.D.12)
Optimality conditions for effective labour, fertility, and education expenditures
w
′
t = (1− dt)(1− at)ωt (3.D.13)
ft =
(1− η)γ1htw′t
(φhtwt − δ)(1 + γ1) (3.D.14)
st =
ηφhtw
′
t − δ
1− η (3.D.15)
Sets
t ∈ 1, .., T , where T = 10. Equations (3.D.6), (3.D.7) apply only for t ∈ (1, .., T −1). For T = 10
(3.D.2) becomes:
ut = ln(ct) (3.D.16)
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Allocation
max W subject to equations 3.D.1-3.D.12 with α = 1.
Reporting
We interpret periods as 30 years, and young as 15-45. Population is defined and computed
ex-post as:
Pt = Nt−1 +Nt + Nt+1 (3.D.17)
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